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Notes 
DANGEROUS LIAISONS:  PARAMOUR NO 
MORE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Romantic office relationships are far more prevalent than some 
might realize.1  Out of 1000 professionals surveyed on the subject, 47% of 
workers admit that they have been involved in an office romance, while 
an additional 19% admitted that they would be willing to do so if the 
opportunity arose.2  Eleven percent of respondents answered that they 
have dated their boss or another superior, while 31% answered that they 
have never dated their boss or another superior, but would be willing to 
do so.3  Only 13% of respondents reported that their company has an 
office romance policy, while 51% said their company does not have an 
office romance policy.4  
With so many people engaging in consensual workplace romances, it 
may be surprising that the number of sex discrimination claims filed 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has 
increased dramatically since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5  
From 1991 to 1992, the percentage of sexual harassment claims filed with 
the EEOC increased by 62% (due largely to the Anita-Hill and Clarence 
                                                 
1 Vault’s Office Romance Survey 2003, http://www.vault.com/nr/main_article_detail. 
jsp?article_id=16513021&ht_type=5 (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). Vault’s 2003 Office Romance 
Survey is based on responses from over 1,000 professionals at companies nationwide.  Id. 
2 Id.  When asked under which circumstances an office romance is unacceptable, only 
21% of respondents answered that a relationship between a manager and a subordinate is 
inappropriate.  Id. 
3 Id.  Out of the people who have dated their boss or superior, 57% entered the 
relationship in a mutual manner, while 31% said that their boss or superior initiated the 
relationship.  Id. 
4 Id.  Thirty-six percent of respondents do not know whether an office romance policy 
exists within their workplace.  Id.  A long term relationship was established by 19% of 
respondents as a result of their office romance, whereas 3% answered that one or both of 
them were terminated as a result of their workplace relationship, and 1% answered that 
they were merely reprimanded by management.  Id.  Fifty-five percent of respondents 
answered that they experienced no repercussions resulting from their office romance.  Id. 
5 Giovanna Weller & Nick Zaino, The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964: How Did Sex Get Into the Act?, http://www.carmodylaw.com/CM/Articles/ 
Articles70.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).  Recent EEOC statistics indicate that sex 
discrimination claims account for 30.1% of charges filed in violation of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.  Id. 
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Thomas hearings),6 and such claims increased by an additional 62% 
between 1992 and 2003.7   
Recently, the California Supreme Court handed down an 
unprecedented sex discrimination decision, Miller v. Department of 
Corrections,8 which seems poised to create many problems for employers 
within California and throughout the United States.9  This case has 
broadened the scope of sexual harassment claims above and beyond 
what any court has previously held when confronted with a consensual 
inter-office relationship hostile work environment claim between a 
supervisor and employee.10  According to the court, even though a 
romantic relationship between a supervisor and his or her paramour11 is 
consensual, other employees who believe that the paramour received 
special treatment in a severe and pervasive manner may sue under a 
hostile work environment sex discrimination claim.12  The Miller holding 
marks the first time both men and women can be deemed injured by 
sexual favoritism.13  Consequently, this holding has become a persuasive 
precedent for other states to follow, thus paving the way for lawsuits 
from employees to challenge any decision of a supervisor who is 
involved in, or allegedly involved in, a workplace romance.14 
Part II.A of this Note presents a brief history of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).15  Part II.B provides an overview of sex 
discrimination under Title VII, specifically laying out the differences 
between quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment 
sexual harassment claims.16  Next, Part II.C explains the traditional 
standards of liability for employers in sexual harassment cases.17  Part 
II.D discusses the EEOC’s Policy Guidance on employer liability for 
sexual favoritism under Title VII, which may be used by courts as 
guidance in making decisions under Title VII law.18  Part II.E follows, 
                                                 
6 See infra note 27. 
7 Weller & Zaino, supra note 5. 
8 Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005). 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 See infra Part III.A. 
11 A “paramour” is defined as “an illicit lover.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 899 (11th ed. 2004). 
12 See infra Part II.F. 
13 See infra Part II.F. 
14 See infra Part III.B. 
15 See infra Part II.A. 
16 See infra Part II.B. 
17 See infra Part II.C. 
18 See infra Part II.D. 
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explaining the history of sexual favoritism in the workplace, referred to 
as the “paramour” theory, and the types of scenarios in which such 
claims arise.19  Finally, Part II.F introduces the decision in Miller. 20 
Part III begins with a discussion of the expansion in the breadth of 
sexual harassment law created by Miller and how the current EEOC 
guidelines are insufficient to handle widespread sexual favoritism 
claims.21  Part III.B addresses the implications that the Miller holding 
may have on employers, employees, and the workplace as a whole.22  
Part III.C concludes the Analysis portion by discussing various 
preventative measures employers can take to protect themselves from 
new risks they face as a result of the Miller holding.23 
Part IV proposes amendments to the EEOC Policy Guidance on 
Sexual Favoritism to better accommodate claims based on sexual 
favoritism.24  These changes clarify the current guidance and better assist 
the courts, employers, and employees in determining which factors point 
to widespread instances rather than isolated instances of sexual 
favoritism.25 Finally, Part V reiterates that the scope of sexual harassment 
jurisprudence has been greatly expanded as a result of Miller and that 
immediate action must be taken by the EEOC to protect employers and 
control sexual harassment claims made by third parties who were not 
directly subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment.26 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. A Brief History of Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence 
Sexual harassment is a pervasive problem that continues to plague 
American workplaces in the twenty-first century.27  Title VII establishes a 
                                                 
19 See infra Part II.E. 
20 See infra Part II.F. 
21 See infra Part III.A. 
22 See infra Part III.B. 
23 See infra Part III.C. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part IV. 
26 See infra Part V. 
27 Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by 
Supervisors, EEOC Notice 915.002, (June 18, 1999) [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance].  
Sexual harassment litigation has expanded at an extraordinary rate.  Id.  The number of 
harassment charges filed with the EEOC and state fair employment practices agencies has 
risen significantly in recent years.  Id.  For example, the number of sexual harassment 
charges increased from 6,883 in 1991 to 15,618 in 1998.  Id.  One factor offered as 
explanation for this boom in sexual harassment lawsuits is the 1991 nationally televised 
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private cause of action for sexual harassment in the workplace.28  The 
primary goal of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in employment 
against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment based on differences in race, color, religion, 
national origin, and sex.29  Thus, Title VII’s purpose in the realm of sex 
                                                                                                             
Clarence Thomas Supreme Court Senate confirmation hearings that introduced the law of 
sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as the wide variety of workplace conduct that 
can constitute an actionable harassment claim, to millions of Americans.  62 AM. JUR. Trials 
235 § 1 (2005).  In 1989, the Supreme Court issued several decisions that were seen as a 
threat to other civil rights protections.  Weller & Zaino, supra note 5.  See also Wards Cove 
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (making it more difficult  to establish 
discrimination by disparate impact); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) 
(allowing the employer to avoid liability in a mixed motive case by showing that it would 
have made the same decision even if it had not allowed a discriminatory reason to play a 
role); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that workplace 
harassment and discrimination on the job were not actionable under Section 1981); Martin 
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that white men who were not parties in litigation that 
resulted in a court-approved affirmative action could challenge the plan); Lorance v. AT&T 
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (limitations period runs from the date of the allegedly 
discriminatory adoption of a seniority system plan); Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. 
Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (finding that attorneys’ fees can be recovered under Title VII 
against losing interveners only if the intervener’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation).  Congress recognized what was happening and passed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1990.  Weller & Zaino, supra note 5.  President Bush vetoed the bill, labeling it 
an unacceptable “quota” bill, so Congress raised a modified version of the bill early the 
next session.  Id.  The modified bill also seemed “destined to fail” because President Bush 
had a 91% approval rating due to the Persian Gulf War.  Id.  However, “key events 
intervened to influence the law” and as the 1991 bill was pending in Congress, President 
Bush nominated Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court in July 1991.  Id.  During Justice 
Thomas’s confirmation hearings, a former colleague, Anita Hill, alleged that Thomas 
sexually harassed her when he was the Chairman of the EEOC.  Id.  Inevitably, “[t]hese 
allegations caused a media frenzy resulting in nationally televised confirmation hearings 
that were viewed by millions of Americans.”  Id.  After three days of hearings, Thomas’s 
nomination was confirmed.  Id.  Another factor occurring during this period was the 
widespread riots erupting in Los Angeles in protest to the police beating of Rodney King.  
Id.  That issue again put civil rights in the forefront of the minds of Congress and the 
American people.  Id.  As a result, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with 
enough votes to override a presidential veto.  Id.  President Bush signed virtually the same 
bill that just one year before he vetoed as a “quota” bill.  Id.  The 1991 amendments 
overruled many prior Supreme Court decisions restricting civil rights, “[giving] employees 
the right to have a jury trial, and expand[ing] the remedies available to prevailing plaintiffs 
to include compensatory and punitive damages.”  Id. 
28 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).  Title VII 
was enacted in 1964 and took effect in July of 1965.  It was expanded by the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, which creates compensatory and punitive damage remedies for claims of 
intentional discrimination.  The 1991 Act was signed into law on November 21, 1991, and 
the expanded remedies apply to all conduct occurring after that date.  Title VII is the 
principle statutory medium by which sexual harassment suits are prosecuted and the basis 
from which state legislation is typically drafted. 
29 Id.  The relevant portions of Title VII provide: 
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discrimination is to eliminate disparate treatment of men and women 
based on gender.30 
On February 8, 1964, while the civil rights bill was being debated on 
the House floor, Howard W. Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the Rules 
Committee and staunch opponent of all civil rights legislation, stood up 
and offered a one word amendment, “sex”, to Title VII.31  Smith claimed 
that “sex” should be added to the bill in order “to prevent discrimination 
against another minority group, the women,” when in reality, “sex” was 
offered as a desperate attempt to kill the entire bill.32  However, the 
                                                                                                             
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his [her] 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because 
of such individual’s . . . sex . . . ; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify 
[her or] his employees or applicants for employment in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [her or] his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex. 
Id. The phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” exudes a congressional 
intent “‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in 
employment,” thus the language of the Act “is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ 
discrimination.”  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978))) (some internal quotations omitted).  The Act’s language 
includes allowing people to work in a non-discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.  
Id.  Title VII applies to employees, job applicants, and former employees.  See Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). 
30 See Manhart, 435 U.S.  at 707. 
31 Jo Freeman, Ph.D., How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of 
Public Policy, http://www.jofreeman.com/lawandpolicy/titlevii.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 
2005) (referencing 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964)). 
32 Id.  Congressman Smith maintained at the time that he was very serious about the bill.  
Id.  Such a preposterous notion inspired several hours of humorous debate to which the 
primary argument against the additional prohibition against discrimination based on sex to 
Title VII was that sex discrimination was sufficiently different from other types of 
discrimination and that it ought to receive completely separate legislative treatment.  Id.  
The White House, a few women’s rights groups, and others that supported the Civil Rights 
bill were opposed to the amendment because they feared it would defeat the entire bill.  
Weller & Zaino, supra note 5.  Every man that had voted in favor of the amendment, with 
the exception of Representative Ross Bass, had voted against the bill.  Id.  For further 
commentary that the word “sex” was added to Title VII to undercut the bill,  see Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); 
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 60 
F.R.D. 432, 434-35 (W.D. Pa. 1973); David M. Neff, Note, Denial of Title VII Protection to 
Transsexuals: Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 553 (1985); Comment, 
Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1167 (1971). 
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amended bill was passed by a 168 to 133 teller vote,33 and the debate 
over the word “sex” was later enshrined as “ladies day in the House.”34  
As a result of such a hurried addition to the amendment, the Supreme 
Court noted that “we are left with little legislative history to guide us in 
interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on 
‘sex.’”35 
B. Elements Common to all Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII 
The EEOC has defined sexual harassment to include unwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature when submission to such conduct is made 
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s 
employment.36  If the submission to or rejection of such conduct has the 
                                                 
33 During a teller vote, members vote by turning in signed index cards: green for yea and 
red for nay. C-Span, Congressional Glossary, http://www.c-span.org/guide/congress/ 
glossary/tellervt.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
34 Freeman, supra note 31.  Congressman Smith’s strategy to defeat the bill backfired and 
was sent to the Senate.  Weller & Zaino, supra note 5.  Representative Martha Griffiths, one 
of the few women in Congress at the time, is often credited with convincing the 
predominantly male House to pass the amendment.  Id.  After 58 days of filibuster by 
Southern Senators, the longest filibuster in Congressional history, the bill was passed and 
signed into law by President Johnson on July 2, 1964, prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion and sex.  Id. 
35 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
36 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2005).  The EEOC oversees Title VII and processes 
discrimination complaints.  Elizabeth Jubin Fujiwara & Joyce M. Brown, Causes of Action for 
Post-Ellerth/Faragher Title VII Employment Sexual Harassment Claims, in 27 CAUSES OF 
ACTION 2d 1, § 27 (2005).  Prior to Title VII’s enactment, there was very little recourse 
available to women who suffered from sexual harassment in the workplace.  Id.  Women in 
such a circumstance could either threaten legal action or actually bring a lawsuit based on 
common-law torts, such as assault and battery.  Id.  “This finally changed with the 
guidelines pronounced by the EEOC originally in 1980 in which the EEOC defines illegal 
sexual harassment to include:  (1) unwelcome sexual advances, (2) requests for sexual 
favors, and (3) ‘other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.’”  Id.  Specifically the 
EEOC’s Sexual Harassment guidelines provide: 
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title 
VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute 
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made 
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment 
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s 
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment. 
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual 
harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole 
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purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work 
performance, an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment 
may be created.37  Typically, a prima facie case for supervisor sexual 
harassment can fall under one of two theories:  quid pro quo or hostile 
work environment.38  Under both theories, an employee must prove that 
(1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harassment, and (2) the 
harassment complained of was based on sex. 39 
                                                                                                             
and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the 
sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents 
occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action 
will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)-(b). 
37 Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36. 
38 Id.  A prima facie case in an employee’s action alleging sexual harassment under Title 
VII by a supervisor or superior requires proof that: (1) an unlawful harassment has 
occurred; (2) the harasser has supervisory status; and (3) the discrimination was based on 
sex.  Id. 
39 Id.  An employer is liable for a hostile work environment, even if no tangible 
employment action was taken, if the harassing conduct was severe or pervasive and the 
employer failed to take reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassing behavior and 
the employee reasonably tried to inform the employer to correct the harassment.  Id.  It is 
important to note that sexual harassment will be deemed “unwelcome” even if the person 
eventually submits to the request.  Id.  The Supreme Court has held that courts must ask 
whether the “respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were 
unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.”  
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.  See also Mosher v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 617 (2001) (finding where a long term sexual relationship goes 
sour, no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff was anything other than a willing 
participant, and thus it will be the unusual case that can escape summary judgment); 
O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 735 (1st Cir. 2001) (joining the Sixth Circuit 
and holding, contrary to the Tenth Circuit, that the determination whether a female 
firefighter was subjected to hostile work environment was not required to be made in the 
context of blue collar environment in which crude language was commonly used, since a 
woman who chooses to work in a male-dominated trade does not thereby relinquish her 
right to be free from sexual harassment); Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 
736-37 (8th Cir. 2000) (supervisors alleged use of offensive language was not unwelcome 
where employee’s testimony indicated that she used offensive language herself around 
supervisor and other employees); Scusa v. Nestle USA Co., Inc., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 
1999) (female factory employee failed to demonstrate that behavior of her co-workers was 
unwelcome where undisputed evidence showed that the employee engaged in behavior 
similar to that which she claimed was unwelcome and offensive, including the use of 
profanity, telling off-color jokes at work, and teasing other employees).  In addition, courts 
look to the totality of circumstances to make determinations as to whether the harassment 
complained of was based on sex.  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.  The Supreme Court in Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) emphasized that harassment in the 
workplace is not automatically discrimination because of sex “merely because the words 
used had sexual content or connotations.”  See also Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 
1080, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1656 (2001) (while sexually explicit 
language and sex stereotyping may constitute evidence of sex discrimination, such does 
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1. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment  
The term sexual harassment may lead many people to think of the 
first type of sexual harassment, premised on “quid pro quo” (literally 
“something for something”), where the employer conditions some type 
of economic benefit on an employee engaging in sexual acts.40  In order 
to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, a 
plaintiff must present evidence that he or she was subjected to 
unwelcome conduct, based on sex, and that the reaction to that conduct 
was then used as the basis for decisions, either actual or threatened, 
affecting compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.41  
                                                                                                             
not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision and 
sexually explicit insults that arise solely from altercations over work-related issues and 
because of employee’s apparent homosexuality do not violate Title VII).  In addition, 
discrimination based on personal animosity is not actionable.  See Succar v. Dade County 
Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000) (male school teacher failed to establish that 
harassment by another teacher with whom he had had a consensual sexual relationship 
was based on sex, where evidence suggested teacher’s harassment was motivated not by 
his male gender, but rather by his contempt for the alleged harasser following their failed 
relationship; personal animosity is not the equivalent of sex discrimination and an 
employee cannot turn a personal feud with another employee into a sex discrimination 
case). 
40 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.  The plaintiff in Meritor feared that she would lose her job if she 
failed to give in to her employer’s sexual demands.  Id. at 60.  This claim could have fallen 
into the category of quid pro quo since she would be losing an economic benefit; however, 
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that a quid pro quo claim was not necessary for 
the plaintiff to recover under a sexual harassment theory.  Id. at 65.  The Court found that 
sexual harassment can also occur when the sexual harassment creates a hostile work 
environment.  Id.  The Court relied on holdings from lower courts and the EEOC 
Guidelines on Sex Discrimination in reaching its decision.  Id. at 65-68. 
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000).  To establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment under Title VII, the employee must show that: (1) the employee belongs to a 
protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the 
harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the employee’s reaction to the harassment 
affected tangible aspects of employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment; and (5) that the employer knew, or should have known of the harassment 
and took no effective remedial action.  Id.  See also Velez Cortes v. Nieves Valle, 253 F. 
Supp. 2d 206 (D.P.R. 2003).  In Velez Cortes, a female employee established that she was 
subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment by the company president where she was 
employed because she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, statements with overt 
sexual overtones,  and inquiries into her personal life.  Id. at 212-13.  The company was 
aware of the president’s actions, but took no steps to stop it and the employee suffered the 
tangible job detriment of being terminated without ever having been reprimanded 
previously.  Id. at 214-15. 
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2. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment 
As a supplement to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims, a 
broader hostile work environment claim for sexual harassment 
developed, culminating with the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson.42  The core of the Meritor holding is that a plaintiff 
may establish a Title VII violation by proving that sex discrimination 
resulting from sexual harassment creates a hostile or abusive work 
environment.43  Thus, in order for a hostile work environment claim to 
be actionable, the sexual harassment in question “must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment 
and create an abusive working environment.’”44   
                                                 
42 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.  A number of issues relating to Title VII sexual harassment 
were decided by the Meritor court, ruling that:  (1) sexual harassment is indeed sex 
discrimination, and is prohibited by Title VII; (2) sexual harassment that creates a hostile 
and abusive environment may violate Title VII, even in the absence of tangible adverse 
economic consequences for the employee; and (3) an employee’s “voluntary” submission to 
an employer’s sexual advances will not necessarily defeat a harassment claim, the true 
issue being whether the advances were “unwelcome.”  Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36.  
However, the Meritor court left open the question of employer liability.  Id.  The Court 
acknowledged the possible injustices which can be created for either the employer or the 
employee by hard and fast rules.  Id.  However, it was left up to the appellate courts to 
devise a liability test for employers using agency principles.  Id.  Over the years, two tests 
emerged from the appellate courts: (1) a proven quid pro quo sexual harassment claim 
resulting in an employer’s vicarious liability; and (2) a proven hostile work environment 
sexual harassment claim resulting in employer’s liability only if the employer was further 
proven negligent.  Id.  Since the Meritor decision, courts nationwide have recognized the 
distinctions drawn between quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual 
harassment.  Id.  In 1998, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to two cases, Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
(1998), to establish more defined parameters for the courts to apply when employer liability 
issues arose in sexual harassment complaints.  Id.  The Court held that an employer is 
vicariously liable for unlawful sexual harassment by a supervisor that culminates in a 
tangible employment action against the victim.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61.  This holding 
established that the Court will look closely at whether the plaintiff establishes a nexus 
between the harassment and the tangible employment action.  Fujiwara & Brown, supra 
note 36.  According to employment experts Katz and Kabat, “The result is that practitioners 
should focus on the presence or absence of a tangible employment action, and not the 
categories of ‘quid pro quo’ and ‘hostile work environment’ which the Burlington Court 
effectively abandoned.”  Debra S. Katz, et. al., Advanced Employment Law and Litigation: 
Sexual Harassment In The Workplace, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 5-7, 2002 (on file with 
the author). 
43 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.  The Court rejected the argument that a Title VII claim could 
only be based on “tangible, economic barriers erected by discrimination.”  Id. at 64. 
44 Id. at 67.  Although the Court found that the allegations in Meritor supported a hostile 
environment claim, the Court did not define what types of specific conduct would qualify 
as “sufficiently pervasive” to support a hostile environment claim.  Id. at 72. 
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Additionally, the creation of a hostile work environment need not 
necessarily involve unwelcome sexual advances.45   
Sexual harassment creates a hostile, offensive, 
oppressive, or intimidating work environment and 
deprives its victim of [the employee’s] statutory right to 
work in a place free of discrimination, when the sexually 
harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, 
distresses or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt 
[the employee’s] emotional tranquility in the workplace, 
affect [the employee’s] ability to perform her job as 
usual, or otherwise interferes with and undermines [the 
employee’s] personal sense of well-being.46   
To determine whether conduct is actionable, courts utilize the 
following two-part test: (1) the harassment must be sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to create a work environment that a reasonable person would 
find hostile or abusive; and (2) the plaintiff must actually perceive the 
work environment to have been hostile or abusive.47 
                                                 
45 Accardi v. Super. Ct., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 295-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).  See also 
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d. Cir. 1990); McKinney v. Dole, 765 
F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  To plead a cause of action for hostile work environment 
sexual harassment, it is “only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the 
discrimination, and that if the plaintiff ‘had been a man she would not have been treated in 
the same manner.’”  Accardi, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295-96 (quoting Tomkins v. Public Serv. 
Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1977)).  Generally, hostile work environment 
shows itself in the form of intimidation and hostility for the purpose of interfering with an 
individual’s work performance.  Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 782 (1st Cir. 
1990) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1983)). 
46 Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).  In 
Fisher, a nurse and her husband, a physician, brought actions against the nurse’s 
supervising physician, the hospital where they worked, and a third physician.  Id. at 846.  
The action stemmed from the supervising physician’s sexual harassment of the nurse and 
other women, her complaint to the hospital against the supervising physician, and the 
retaliatory actions against both the nurse and the husband by the third physician and the 
hospital.  Id. at 847.  The appellate court held that appellants should have been permitted to 
amend the complaint to allege environmental sexual harassment, that the hospital was not 
liable for the doctor’s behavior, but might have been liable for the lease termination, that 
there was no retaliation cause of action against the pediatrician, and that there was no 
interference with business relations nor support for punitive damages.  Id. at 860-61. 
47 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). To establish a prima facie 
case of hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII, the employee must 
show that: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subject to 
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment 
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or 
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a. Severe or Pervasive Conduct  
According to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris v. Forklift 
Systems,48 both an objective and subjective standard needs to be satisfied 
in order to recover under a hostile work environment sexual harassment 
theory.49  The emphasis of both the language and the legislative history 
of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in employment;50 therefore, 
the proscribed differentiation under Title VII must be a distinction based 
on a person’s sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations.51   
When the workplace is permeated with “discriminatory 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” Title VII is violated.52  Factors 
contributing to a hostile environment may include the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct, the severity of the conduct, whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 
performance.53  All of the circumstances within an environment need to 
be evaluated to determine if it is “hostile” or “abusive.”54   
The severe or pervasive element in hostile work environment cases is 
often difficult to assess because there is a general inconsistency among 
holdings as to what actually qualifies as sufficiently severe or pervasive 
conduct.55  Generally, courts have required more than a single instance of 
                                                                                                             
should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.  Callahan 
v. Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1996). 
48 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. 
49 Id. 
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).  See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.  See also Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). 
51 DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 408 
U.S. 825 (1987).  See also Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 
n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)) 
(the congressional intent of Title VII pertaining to terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment was to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women” in employment); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) 
(quoting same). 
52 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
53 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
54 Id. 
55 AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 37.  Not every unpleasant workplace is a sexually 
hostile environment under Title VII.  Id.  Occasional vulgarities, including banter tinged 
with sexual innuendo, is neither severe or pervasive nor offensive enough to be actionable.  
Id.  Under Title VII, in cases of sexual harassment, a workplace that is actionable is the one 
that is “hellish.” See Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the employer was not liable for sexual harassment because it did not have 
reason to know of the alleged harassment and plaintiff had options other than quitting, 
thus she could not prevail on the constructive discharge claim). 
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inappropriate conduct before they will find a basis for a claim under a 
hostile work environment theory.56  However, there are decisions that go 
even further, establishing that even multiple isolated incidents are not 
enough to form a basis for a hostile work environment claim where they 
fall short of a discernable pattern of actual harassment.57  Because the 
requirement is that the conduct must be severe or pervasive, some courts 
apply a sliding-scale approach to the analysis, such that a greater degree 
of pervasiveness will make up for a lesser degree of severity and vice 
versa.58  One such court observed that “the required showing of severity 
or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the 
pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.”59  How frequently the 
conduct must occur in order to state a cause of action is difficult to 
discern given the vast inconsistencies in case law.60 
b. The Employer Should Have Known About the Hostile Environment 
In addition to evaluating the severe or pervasive conduct, the 
claimant in a hostile work environment claim must establish that the 
employer knew, or should have known of the hostile work environment, 
and failed to take the appropriate remedial actions necessary to rid the 
work environment of the harassment.61  This may be the most significant 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., Raines v. City of Kimball, 916 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Kuhn v. Philip 
Morris U.S.A., 814 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221 (1994); Raley v. Bd. 
of St. Mary’s County Comm’rs, 752 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Md. 1990).  Under these cases, there 
was no basis for a sexual harassment claim because a single isolated incident could not be 
used to prove sexual harassment. 
57 See, e.g., Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d. 526 (7th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Tower 
Air, CV-90-3085, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9372 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 1993).  Under these cases, a 
pattern or practice of offensive conduct is generally required to satisfy the requirement that 
the conduct be severe or pervasive enough to establish a true hostile work environment 
claim. 
58 AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 37.  The current state of the law in regards to this 
element of a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment is best 
summarized as requiring proof of either a long-standing pattern of harassing conduct, or, if 
there are only a few isolated occurrences, a showing that the offensive conduct was 
especially egregious.  Id. 
59 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d. 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).  See also Ross v. Double Diamond 
Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 
1986). 
60 See also Chad W. King, Note, Sex, Love Letters, and Vicious Rumors: Anticipating New 
Situations Creating Sexually Hostile Work Environments, 36 BYU J. PUB. L. 341 (1995) 
(discussing evolving bases of employer liability under the Title VII hostile work 
environment theory). 
61 Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988).  The term 
“management” as used for determining whether an employer had actual knowledge of 
sexual harassment under Title VII includes a person with the power to hire and fire the 
offending employee, provide significant input into employment decisions, and take 
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element from an employer’s perspective.62  The result is that an employer 
bears no liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment under 
this element where the employer has no reason to know of the harassing 
conduct.63  Additionally, if the employer demonstrates that immediate 
and appropriate action was taken in response to a reported hostile work 
environment claim, the employer is generally released from liability for a 
subsequent claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment.64  The 
employer must take prompt remedial action that is both reasonably 
calculated to end the harassment and of a disciplinary nature.65    
The situation becomes more delicate when the complainant’s 
supervisor participated in or was the cause of the harassment.66  Initially 
the argument was made that the employer knew, or should have known 
of the harassing conduct because one of the employer’s supervisors was 
responsible for creating the hostile work environment and thus a strict 
liability standard was imposed.67  Around that same time, other courts 
ruled that the employer could bear liability for a hostile work 
                                                                                                             
disciplinary action and instruct the offending employee to cease the harassing behavior, or 
to implement other means of taking remedial action.  42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000); Sharp v. City 
of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999). 
62 AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 39. 
63 See generally Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 1994). 
64 See, e.g., Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 17 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1994); Saxton v. American Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993); Rouse v. City of Milwaukee, 921 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. 
Wis. 1996); Walsh v. Nat’l Westminster Bancorp, 921 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Bivens v. 
Jeffers Vet Supply, 873 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Ala. 1994). 
65 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).  An employer must satisfy two elements 
in order to successfully raise an affirmative defense to Title VII liability for sexual 
harassment by a supervisor: (1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior; and (2) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000; Madray v. Publix 
Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000).  The 
standard is the same in the case of non-employees, but the employer’s control over such 
individuals’ misconduct is considered.  Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27. 
66 AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 39. 
67 See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. App. 1981).  In Bundy, the plaintiff was 
repeatedly subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, which she rejected.  Id. at 940.  The 
plaintiff complained about the conduct to her supervisor and he replied that “any man in 
his right mind would want to rape you” and he “casually dismissed” all of her complaints.  
Id.  The District Court of Columbia Circuit recognized a claim for sex discrimination based 
on emotional and psychological factors in the work environment, which took sexual 
harassment jurisprudence beyond the loss of tangible job benefits realm.  Id. at 943-44. 
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environment created by supervisors only if the employer knew of the 
harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.68 
Today, courts generally agree that employers are not to be held 
strictly liable in cases arising from hostile work environment sexual 
harassment, even if supervisory personnel contributed to the 
environment.69  Some courts apply agency principles as a method of 
creating a standard,70 while others find that the analysis depends upon 
general negligence principles based on whether the employer knew, or 
should have known, of the supervisor’s proclivity for harassment.71  
                                                 
68 Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 915 (11th Cir. 1982).  In Henson, an employee claimed 
that the police chief created a hostile and offensive working environment for women, that 
her resignation was a constructive discharge, and that the police chief prevented her from 
attending the police academy because she refused to have sexual relations with him.  Id. at 
899-900.  The court affirmed the dismissal of employee’s constructive discharge claim 
because the finding that she did not resign because of sexual harassment was not clearly 
erroneous.  Id. at 907.  The court reversed and remanded her hostile work environment 
claim because she did not have to show a tangible job detriment and her quid pro quo 
claim was reversed and remanded because the district court erroneously found a lack of 
corroborative evidence.  Id. at 907, 911-13. 
69 See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 
Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987). 
70 The Supreme Court has instructed courts to use agency principles when deciding 
employer liability for sexually hostile work environments.  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).  Meritor rejects the possibility that employers are strictly 
liable for hostile environments and also repudiates the notion that a grievance procedure 
will automatically protect the employer. Id. at 72-73.  See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 
F.3d 1295, 1324 (2d Cir. 1995) (Baker, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title VII permits an 
employer and that employer’s agent to be held jointly and severally liable for Title VII 
violations); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. App. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011 (1995)) 
(applying traditional common law principles of agency to the facts and holding that the 
plaintiff failed to support her Title VII sex discrimination claim on either a quid pro quo or 
hostile work environment basis); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994).  In 
Bouton, the court discussed how liability is imposed on the master when the servant 
purports to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there is reliance upon apparent 
authority, or he is aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.  
Id. at 108.  If the harasser is an agent of the employer, the employer is liable.  Id. at 109.  The 
court held that BMW was not liable under traditional agency principles.  Id. at 111. 
71 See, e.g., Rushing v. United Airlines, 919 F. Supp 1101, 1107 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  The 
question of liability vel non is decided under negligence principles.  Saxton v. American Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 
F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990)): 
It is a negligence standard that closely resembles the “fellow servant” 
rule, from the era when industrial accidents were governed by 
negligence rather than workers’ compensation law. Under that rule, as 
under Title VII, the employer, provided it has used due care in hiring 
the offending employee in the first place, is liable for that employee’s 
torts against a coworker only if, knowing or having reason to know of 
the misconduct, the employer unreasonably fails to take appropriate 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/5
2006] Paramour No More 317 
Other courts go so far as to combine the elements of the agency and 
negligence theories.72  There is, however, no clear standard for employer 
liability where supervisors are involved.73 
Thus, an employer can be held vicariously liable for a hostile work 
environment claim if no tangible employment action was taken, but the 
harassing conduct was severe or pervasive, the employer failed to take 
reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassing behavior, and the 
employee reasonably tried to inform the employer to correct the 
harassment.74   
C. Employer Defenses 
Once it has been determined that an employer should have known 
about alleged harassment, the standard under which employers are 
subject to vicarious liability for unlawful harassment by supervisors 
must be determined.75  The Supreme Court spelled out this standard in 
                                                                                                             
corrective action. The employer acts unreasonably either if it delays 
unduly or if the action it does take, however promptly, is not 
reasonably likely to prevent the misconduct from recurring. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
72 See, e.g., Redman v. Lima City Sch. Dist. Bd of Educ., 889 F. Supp 288 (N.D. Ohio 
1995).  The court determined that whether or not the employer is liable for an employee’s 
harassing actions depends on: (1) whether the employee’s harassing actions were 
foreseeable or fell within the scope of his employment; and (2) even if they were, whether 
the employer responded adequately and effectively to negate liability.  Id. at 294. 
73 AM. JUR. Trials, supra note 27, § 39. 
74 Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36. 
75 Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27.  The EEOC defines supervisor to include both 
an individual with “authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions” 
and an individual who has “authority to direct the employee’s daily work activities.”  Id.  
See also Gawley v. Ind. Univ., 276 F.3d 301, 310-11 (7th Cir. 2001) (although the harasser 
was not the female police officer’s immediate or higher supervisor, it cannot be said that he 
was not aided by the agency relationship in carrying out the harassment where the 
harasser occasionally acted as plaintiff’s commanding officer, he had the ability to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings against her, he had special access to her because of his position as 
supervisor in charge of uniforms, and it was through this position that harasser had the 
opportunity to fondle employee’s breast and verbally abuse her with regard to the fit of her 
pants); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1999) (in general, 
complete authority to act on employer’s behalf without the agreement of others is not 
necessary to meet Title VII’s agency standard for supervisor liability and thus even if the 
unit leader did not have authority to act alone, where witnesses testified that he was part of 
the ruling “triumvirate” in the office, and part of a team that decided to strip employee of 
her office, the unit leader had supervisory authority for purposes of imposing liability on 
the company for his conduct).  But see Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 506 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that even though the harassers had authority to manage the employee’s 
work assignments, investigate complaints and disputes, and recommend sanctions for 
rules violations to department manager, they were not supervisors so as to trigger 
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Burlington Industries v. Ellerth76 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.77  The 
standard of liability set forth in these decisions is based on two 
principles:  (1) that an employer is responsible for the acts of its 
supervisors; and (2) employers should be encouraged to prevent 
harassment and employees should be encouraged to avoid or limit the 
harm from harassment.78  According to the Court, an employer is always 
liable for a supervisor’s harassment if it culminates in a tangible 
employment action.79  However, if a tangible employment action does 
not occur, the employer may avoid liability or limit damages by 
establishing an affirmative defense that includes two necessary elements:  
(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly 
correct any harassing behavior; and (2) the employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.80  The employer 
                                                                                                             
vicarious liability under Title VII); Mikels v. City of Durham 183 F.3d 323, 331-34 (4th Cir. 
1999) (wherein a female police officer could not establish that a male corporal’s sexually 
harassing conduct was aided by the agency relation since the corporal’s authority did not 
include power to take tangible employment actions against the officer; the question is 
whether the person’s employment relation to the victim was such as to constitute a 
continuing threat to her employment conditions that made her vulnerable to and 
defenseless against the particular conduct in ways that comparable conduct by a mere co-
worker would not). 
76 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998). 
77 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 775 (1998).  In Faragher, the Court 
referred to a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the 
employee as its definition of who qualifies as a supervisor for liability purposes.  Id. at 807-
08. 
78 Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27.  While the Faragher and Ellerth decisions 
addressed sexual harassment, the Court’s analysis drew upon standards set forth in cases 
involving harassment on other protected bases.  Moreover, the EEOC has always taken the 
position that the same basic standards apply to all types of prohibited harassment.  See, e.g., 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1 (2005) (“The principles involved here continue to apply to race, 
color, religion or national origin.”); EEOC Compliance Manual Volume II, § 615.11(a), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.htm (“Title VII law and agency 
principles will guide the determination of whether an employer is liable for age harassment 
by its supervisors, employees, or non-employees.”). Thus, the standard of liability set forth 
in the decisions applies to all forms of unlawful harassment.  Enforcement Guidance, supra 
note 27. 
79 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778. 
80 Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27. “In essence, the affirmative defense requires 
that sexual harassment disputes be investigated and resolved internally before proceeding 
to court.  A victim who refuses to assist an internal investigation loses her Title VII claim, 
and an employer who fails to conduct such an investigation loses all defenses to the claim 
of harassment.”  Joann Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over 
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003).  The affirmative 
defense gives credit for such preventive efforts by an employer, thereby “implement[ing] 
clear statutory policy and complement[ing] the Government’s Title VII enforcement 
efforts.”  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. 
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will avoid vicarious liability for its supervisor’s acts if the employer is 
successful in raising the affirmative defense.81 
According to the framework set out in the Ellerth and Faragher 
decisions, if the unlawful sexual harassment did not result in a tangible 
employment action according to the quid pro quo framework, then the 
alleged sexual harassment is reviewed to determine if the harassment 
reached the severe or pervasive behavior required for a hostile work 
environment sexual harassment claim.82  If the alleged sexual harassment 
                                                 
81 Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36.  It is very important to determine whether the 
person who engaged in unlawful harassment had supervisory authority over the 
complainant.  Enforcement Guidance, supra note 27.  An employer is subject to vicarious 
liability for unlawful harassment if the harassment was committed “by a supervisor with 
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.  The federal employment discrimination statutes do not define the 
term supervisor.  Numerous statutes contain the word supervisor, and some contain 
definitions of the term.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1813(r) (2000) (definition of “State bank 
supervisor” in legislation regarding Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(11) (2000) (definition of “supervisor” in National Labor Relations Act); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 8262(2) (2000) (definition of “facility energy supervisor” in Federal Energy Initiative 
legislation).  The definitions vary depending on the purpose and structure of each statute.  
The definition of the word supervisor under other statutes does not control, and is not 
affected by the meaning of that term under the employment discrimination statutes.  The 
statutes make employers liable for the discriminatory acts of their agents, thus logically 
supervisors are agents.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA); 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (ADA) (all defining “employer” as including any agent of the 
employer).  The determination of whether an individual has sufficient authority to qualify 
as a supervisor for purposes of vicarious liability cannot be resolved by a purely 
mechanical application of agency law.  See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797 (analysis of vicarious 
liability “calls not for a mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors set forth 
in the Restatement, but rather an enquiry into the reasons that would support a conclusion 
that harassing behavior ought to be held within the scope of a supervisor’s employment”); 
Id. at 803 n.3 (agency concepts must be adapted to the practical objectives of the anti-
discrimination statutes).  In Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court reasoned that vicarious 
liability for supervisor harassment is appropriate because supervisors are aided in such 
misconduct by the authority that the employers delegated to them.  Id. at 801; Ellerth, 524 
U.S. at 762.  Thus such authority must be of sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser 
explicitly or implicitly in carrying out the harassment.  Enforcement Guidance, supra note 
27. An individual qualifies as an employee’s supervisor if: (1) the individual has authority 
to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the employee; or (2) 
the individual has authority to direct the employee’s daily work activities.  Id. 
82 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.  Prior to Ellerth, the Court noted that there were distinctions in 
employer’s liability based on whether a quid pro quo sexual harassment or hostile work 
environment sexual harassment was alleged.  Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36.  Because of 
such a distinction in liability, the negative effect of encouraging a plaintiff to file a quid pro 
quo sexual harassment claim emerged because such a litigation strategy would leave the 
plaintiff in the preferable position of being able to prevent the employer from raising an 
affirmative defense.  Id.  Such an action defeats the purposes of Title VII that specifically 
encouraged employers to prevent discrimination.  Id.  The Court in Ellerth believed there 
was no statutory basis for such differentiation, stating, “Cases based on threats which are 
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is found to be severe or pervasive, then the employer may raise an 
affirmative defense.83  Once the possibility exists that a sexual 
harassment claim may be brought under Title VII, courts often turn to 
EEOC guidance, which does not bind the courts but provides a useful 
framework for describing Title VII sexual harassment law.84   
D. EEOC Guidance 
Relying on several federal court decisions that have considered 
sexual favoritism, particularly favoritism shown by a supervisor to 
employees who are the supervisor’s sexual partners, the EEOC issued a 
policy statement that examines the question of sexual favoritism within 
the Title VII sexual harassment realm.85  The 1990 policy statement, titled 
Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, 
closely examines three topics:  Section A discusses isolated favoritism; 
Section B discusses favoritism when sexual favors have been coerced; 
and Section C discusses widespread favoring of consensual sexual 
partners.86  In Section A, the EEOC observed that Title VII does not 
                                                                                                             
carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions 
or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work 
environment.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.  Those two terms do not appear in Title VII, which 
forbids only “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his . . . terms [or] 
conditions . . . of employment, because of . . . sex.”  Id.  The Court’s opinion criticized the 
use of the two types of sexual harassment categories, quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment, that had developed over years to define a sexual harassment claim.  27 
CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 1, § 27 (2005).  Nevertheless, the Court used the term hostile work 
environment to determine the nature of Ellerth’s sexual harassment claim, concluding that 
the two terms are of limited utility.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.  The distinction between cases 
involving a carried-out threat and cases involving offensive conduct in general are relevant 
only when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination.  Id.  A 
claim involving only unfulfilled threats, such as the case here, is a hostile work 
environment claim requiring a showing of severe or pervasive conduct.  Id. 
83 Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 36. 
84 Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action for Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 547, 553 (1994).  The EEOC guidelines have since been adopted by many 
courts, and were clearly endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1986 in Meritor.  Fujiwara & 
Brown, supra note 36. 
85 Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC 
Notice No. 915.048 (Jan. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Policy Guidance]. 
86 Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 88 (Cal. 2005). Section A explains: 
An isolated instance of favoritism toward a “paramour” may be unfair, 
but it does not discriminate against women or men in violation of Title 
VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.  
A female charging party who is denied an employment benefit because 
of such sexual favoritism would not have been treated more favorably 
had she been a man nor, conversely, was she treated less favorably 
because she was a woman. 
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prohibit isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon 
consensual romantic relationships.87  Section A of the policy guideance 
specifies that “An isolated instance of favoritism toward a ‘paramour’ (or 
a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against 
women or men in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for 
reasons other than their genders.”88   Furthermore, “A female charging 
party who is denied an employment benefit because of such sexual 
favoritism would not have been treated more favorably had she been a 
man, nor, conversely, was she treated less favorably because she was a 
woman.”89  This portion of the EEOC Policy Statement reflects the 
                                                                                                             
Policy Guidance, supra note 85.  Section B explains the Commission’s position concerning 
coerced sexual activity, which is not relevant to this analysis.  Id.  Section C is the portion in 
which the EEOC discusses sexual favoritism that is based upon consensual affairs that are 
more than isolated: 
If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is widespread in 
a workplace, both male and female colleagues who do not welcome 
this conduct can establish a hostile work environment in violation of 
Title VII regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is directed at 
them and regardless of whether those who were granted favorable 
treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors. In these circumstances, 
a message is implicitly conveyed that the managers view women as 
“sexual playthings,” thereby creating an atmosphere that is demeaning 
to women.  Both men and women who find this offensive can establish 
a violation if the conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter 
the conditions of [their] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’” 
Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). 
“An analogy can be made to a situation in which supervisors in an office regularly make 
racial, ethnic or sexual jokes.  Even if the targets of the humor ‘play along’ and in no way 
display that they object, co-workers of any race, national origin or sex can claim that this 
conduct, which communicates a bias against protected class members, creates a hostile 
work environment for them.”  Id.  Section C of the Policy Guidance continues, stating: 
Managers who engage in widespread sexual favoritism may also 
communicate a message that the way for women to get ahead in the 
workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct or that sexual solicitations 
are a prerequisite to their fair treatment.  This can form the basis of an 
implicit “quid pro quo” harassment claim for female employees, as 
well as a hostile environment claim for both women and men who find 
this offensive. 
Id. 
87 Policy Guidance, supra note 85. 
88 Id.  See Benzies v. Ill. Dep’t of Mental Health, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987) (holding that the denial of a promotion to a woman is not a 
violation if motivated by personal or political favoritism or a grudge); Bellissimo v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986) 
(stating that the discharge of a female employee violates Title VII only if it is done on a 
basis that would not result in the discharge of a male employee). 
89 Policy Guidance, supra note 85.  See Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495 
(W.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988).  The plaintiff in Aluminum alleged 
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traditional position taken by the vast majority of federal courts that have 
considered Title VII sexual favoritism claims. 90 
                                                                                                             
that her supervisor treated her less favorably than her co-worker because the supervisor 
knew that the co-worker was engaged in a romantic relationship with the plant manager.  
Id. at 500-01.  The lower court held that in order to establish a Title VII claim, the plaintiff 
would have to show that her employer would have or did treat males differently.  Id. at 
501.  Since the plaintiff’s male co-workers shared with her the same disadvantage relative 
to the co-worker who was engaged in the affair with the manager, the plaintiff could not 
show that she was treated differently than males.  Id.  See also DeCintio v. Westchester 
County Med. Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986). 
90 See Mundy v. Palmetto Ford, Inc., 998 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that for Title 
VII purposes, “sex” does not include voluntary romance); Candelore v. Clark County 
Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing possibility of sexual 
favoritism recovery and of work environment sexual harassment claim based in part on 
sexual favoritism, but denying recovery on facts); Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 
F.2d 853, 861-63 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing possibility of work environment sexual 
harassment recovery based in part on sexual favoritism, but denying recovery on facts); 
DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306-08 (holding that sexual favoritism based on consensual sexual 
relationship does not constitute sex discrimination); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 880-82 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (recognizing possible recovery for sexual favoritism, but reversing and 
remanding trial court decision that recognized favoritism claim but denied liability on 
facts); Dirksen v. City of Springfield, 842 F. Supp. 1117, 1121-22 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that 
sexual favoritism, although not actionable as such, may help establish that advancement 
generally hinged on granting sexual favors, which supports quid pro quo harassment 
claim); Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F. Supp. 825, 828-30 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying 
sexual favoritism claim and holding that sexual favoritism can help establish quid pro quo 
sexual harassment claim); Ayers v. AT&T, 826 F. Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding 
that sexual favoritism does not constitute sex discrimination); Parrish v. English Am. 
Tailoring Co., No. HAR 86-1879, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14240, at *11 (D. Md. Dec. 14, 1988) 
(noting that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based upon sexual affiliations); 
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D.D.C. 1988) (granting recovery for work 
environment sexual harassment based almost wholly on sexual favoritism); Aluminum, 679 
F. Supp. at 501-02 (holding that sexual favoritism based on consensual sexual relationship 
does not constitute sex discrimination and noting that sexual favoritism may contribute to 
work environment sexual harassment claim, but denying harassment claim on facts); Priest 
v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (finding a violation of Title VII when 
employer prefers female employees who submit to his sexual advances); Toscano v. 
Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983) (holding that proof of sexual favoritism 
helps plaintiff establish that granting sexual favors is necessary for advancement, which 
constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment that violates Title VII).  See also Herman v. 
Western Fin. Corp., 869 P.2d 696, 701-03 (Kan. 1994) (finding sexual favoritism and other 
sex-related employer behavior insufficient for work environment sexual harassment 
liability under Title VII); Polk v. Pollard, 539 So. 2d 675, 677-78 (La. App. 1989) (holding 
that sexual favoritism does not constitute sex discrimination under state statute resembling 
Title VII); Hickman v. W-S Equip. Co., 438 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (same); 
Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 802-03 (N.J. 1990) (holding that at least 
when the sexual relationship is consensual, resulting sexual favoritism does not violate a 
state statute resembling Title VII); Nicolo v. Citibank, 554 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798-99 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1990) (holding that isolated act of sexual favoritism favoring only one employee is not 
actionable under a state statute resembling Title VII, but that sexual favoritism may 
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Section C of the EEOC policy statement also entertains the possibility 
that widespread sexual favoritism may create a hostile work 
environment in violation of Title VII.91  Both male and female colleagues 
who do not welcome the widespread granting of sexual favors can 
establish a hostile work environment claim in violation of Title VII 
regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is directed at them, and 
regardless of whether those who were granted favorable treatment 
willingly bestowed the sexual favors.92  This portion of the policy 
suggests that a demeaning message is implicitly conveyed, namely that 
the managers view women as “sexual playthings” in such 
circumstances.93  The EEOC guidance also states that managers who 
engage in widespread sexual favoritism may also communicate a 
message that the way for women to get ahead in the workplace is by 
engaging in sexual conduct, or that sexual solicitations are a prerequisite 
to their fair treatment.94  This can form the basis of an implicit “quid pro 
quo” harassment claim for female employees, as well as a hostile 
environment claim for both women and men who find such conduct 
offensive.95 
                                                                                                             
contribute to quid pro quo and work environment sexual harassment claims on 
appropriate facts); Kersul v. Skulls Angels Inc., 495 N.Y.S.2d 886, 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) 
(denying motion to dismiss sexual favoritism claim under state statute resembling Title 
VII); Kryeski v. Schott Glass Tech., Inc., 626 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that 
sexual favoritism resulting from consensual relationship does not constitute sex 
discrimination under state statute resembling Title VII), app. denied, 639 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1994). 
91 Policy Guidance, supra note 85 (emphasis added). 
92 Id.  An analogous situation is one in which supervisors in an office regularly make 
racial, ethnic or sexual jokes.  Even if the targets of the humor play along with the conduct 
and do not clearly object, fellow co-workers of any race, national origin or sex can claim 
that this conduct, which communicates a bias against protected class members, creates a 
hostile work environment for them.  See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (discriminatory treatment of medical patients created 
hostile work environment for plaintiff employee); Commission Decision No. 71-969, CCH 
EEOC Decisions (1973) (supervisor’s habitual use of racial epithet in referring to Black 
employees created discriminatory work environment for White Charging Party); EEOC 
Compliance Manual, supra note 78, § 615.3(a)(3) Ex. (1)-(2) (sexual harassment of females 
may create hostile work environment for other male and female employees). 
93 Policy Guidance, supra note 85. 
94 Id.  See, e.g., Rotary, 634 F. Supp. at 571, in which the defendant gave preferential 
treatment to his consensual sexual partner and to those female employees who reacted 
favorably to his sexual advances and other conduct of a sexual nature, and he 
disadvantaged those employees, including the plaintiff, who reacted unfavorably to his 
conduct.  Id. at 576.  The court found a violation of Title VII in part because the defendant’s 
conduct implied that job benefits would be conditioned on an employee’s good-natured 
endurance of his sexually-charged conduct or sexual advances.  Id. at 581. 
95 Policy Guidance, supra note 85.  But see Aluminum, 679 F. Supp. at 501-02.  The court 
rejected a claim that sexual favoritism based on a consensual relationship can create a 
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E. A Brief History of Sexual Favoritism and the Paramour Theory 
The prohibition of sexual discrimination in the workplace has given 
rise to an expansive judicial battleground;96 in fact, within the last twenty 
years, recovery for sexual favoritism has become one such 
battleground.97  The EEOC’s first recognition of a Title VII sexual 
favoritism claim did not surface until the mid-1980s.98  Shortly thereafter, 
two Title VII cases involving claims that an employer unlawfully favored 
a paramour, brought under Title VII, reached the United States Court of 
Appeals: King v. Palmer99 in the District of Columbia Circuit, and 
DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center100 in the Second Circuit.  
King v. Palmer was the first case to clearly recognize the sexual 
favoritism theory as a cause of action.101  In King, the plaintiff, a female 
nurse, claimed she had been denied a promotion to a supervisory 
position in violation of Title VII and that the position went to a less 
qualified co-worker who was engaged in an intimate relationship with 
the male doctor responsible for the promotion.102  Although the issue of 
whether Title VII applied to preferential treatment was not raised on 
appeal, the court stated that it agreed with the lower court’s conclusion 
that the cause of action was cognizable under Title VII.103   
                                                                                                             
hostile environment for others in the workplace.  Id. at 501.  The court found that the 
favoritism itself did not violate Title VII since it was voluntary, and that “hostile behavior 
that does not bespeak an unlawful motive cannot support a hostile work environment 
claim.”  Id. at 502.  However, it is the Commission’s position that had the sexual favoritism 
been widespread, the fact that it was exclusively voluntary and consensual would not have 
defeated a claim that it created a hostile work environment for other people in the 
workplace.  Policy Guidance, supra note 85. 
96 Phillips, supra note 84, at 547. 
97 Id. 
98 Toscano v. Nimmo, 574 F. Supp 1197, 1197 (D. Del. 1983), has generally been associated 
with the first Title VII sexual favoritism claim, although this case falls more along the lines 
of an implied quid pro quo sexual harassment case in which sexual favoritism played a 
significant role.  See Joan E. Van Tol, Eros Gone Awry: Liability Under Title VII for Workplace 
Sexual Favoritism, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 177 (1991). 
99 King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
100 DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 304 (2d Cir. 1986). 
101 King, 778 F.2d at 878. 
102 King v. Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65, 66 (D.D.C. 1984), rev’d, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
103 King, 778 F.2d at 880.  The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of its 
finding that her co-worker was promoted because of the sexual relationship.  Id. at 882.  
There were two reasons that the District Court for the District of Columbia recognized that 
this claim fell within the purview of Title VII.  The first reason was that the EEOC’s 
guidelines supported it.  King, 598 F. Supp. at 67.  The second reason was that when sexual 
favoritism occurs, sex is “for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the 
discrimination.”  Id. at 66-67 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
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A year later, King was countered by DeCintio.104  In DeCintio, seven 
male respiratory therapists claimed that they were unlawfully 
disqualified for a promotion that went to a woman who was engaged in 
a romantic relationship with the department administrator.105  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the department administrator added a requirement 
to the position in order to disqualify them in an effort to enable the 
administrator to hire the woman with whom he had a consensual sexual 
relationship.106  The court held that the department administrator’s 
conduct, although unfair, did not violate Title VII because a consensual 
romantic relationship cannot form the basis of a sex discrimination 
suit.107  The court reasoned that the prohibition of sex discrimination in 
Title VII refers to discrimination on the basis of one’s sex, not on the 
basis of one’s sexual affiliations.108  The therapists’ claims were not 
cognizable under the Act, as they were denied promotions because the 
administrator preferred his paramour, rather than because of their status 
as males.109 
The court observed that in order to recognize plaintiffs’ claims for 
sex discrimination, the traditional definition of “sex” for Title VII 
purposes would have to be expanded to include “sexual liaisons” or 
“sexual attractions” in addition to gender.110  However, the court found 
no justification for expanding the traditional definition so broadly as to 
include an ongoing, voluntary, romantic engagement.111  Moreover, the 
court found that distorting the meaning of the word “sex” in the context 
of Title VII is both “impracticable and unwarranted.”112   
                                                 
104 DeCintio, 807 F.2d 304. 
105 Id. at 305. 
106 Id. The additional provision to be qualified for the position required the applicants to 
be registered with the National Board of Respiratory Therapists.  Id.  The woman with 
whom the administrator was romantically involved was the only person that met this 
requirement.  Id. 
107 Id. at 308.  The Second Circuit declined to adopt the King approach, “[t]o the extent 
that [it] … [could] be interpreted as recognizing Title VII claims for non-gender based sex 
discrimination.”  Id. at 307. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  According to the DeCintio court, “sex” as applied to Title VII, in contrast to the 
other categories afforded protection under the Act, such as race, color, religion, or 
nationality, “logically could only refer to membership in a class delineated by gender, 
rather than sexual activity regardless of gender.”  Id. at 306.  Based on this standard, the 
court stated that the plaintiffs “were not prejudiced because of their status as males; rather, 
they were discriminated against because [the plaintiff’s supervisor] preferred his 
paramour.”  Id. at 308. 
110 Id. at 306. 
111 Id. at 307. 
112 Id. at 308. 
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Additionally, the court distinguished the EEOC’s guidelines, stating 
that the guidelines address the granting of employment benefits because 
of an individual’s “submission” to sexual advances or requests, and that 
the word “submission” connotes a lack of consent.113  Since the 
department administrator did not force anyone to submit to sexual 
advances in order to win a promotion, his conduct was not within the 
purview of the EEOC guidelines.114  Furthermore, the court found that 
the EEOC guidelines referencing sexual relationships between co-
workers should not be used to evaluate personal and social 
relationships.115  In holding that “voluntary, romantic relationships” 
cannot form a basis for a sex discrimination suit under Title VII, the court 
cited its desire to steer clear of “the policing of intimate relationships.”116   
Contrary to the desire of the DeCintio court to stay away from 
personal relationships, the concept of widespread favoritism was 
acknowledged a year later in Broderick v. Ruder.117  In fact, in its 1990 
Policy Guidance, the EEOC discusses Broderick to illustrate how 
widespread sexual favoritism can be found to violate Title VII.118  In 
Broderick, a staff attorney at the Securities and Exchange Commission 
alleged that two of her supervisors had engaged in sexual relationships 
with two secretaries who received promotions, cash awards, and other 
job benefits.119  Another of her supervisors allegedly promoted a staff 
attorney with whom he socialized extensively and to whom he was 
“noticeably attracted.”120  The court found that the supervisor’s conduct 
created a hostile and offensive work environment for the plaintiff and 
other women working in the office.121  The court acknowledged that 
sexual favoritism in the workplace “undermined [the] plaintiff’s 
motivation and work performance and deprived plaintiff, and other . . . 
female employees, of promotions and job opportunities.”122  Although 
                                                 
113 Id. at 307-08. 
114 Id.  The court focused extensively on the fact that the relationship between the 
administrator and his alleged lover was voluntary and consensual and found that it did not 
equate to coercive behavior as prohibited by the EEOC.  Id. at 307-08 (citing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(g) (2005)). 
115 Id. at 308. 
116 Id. 
117 Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988). 
118 Policy Guidance, supra note 85 (emphasis added). 
119 Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1274. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 1278. 
122 Id.  The district court, in reaching its conclusion that Title VII applied to consensual 
relationships did not find that the plaintiff was denied an employment opportunity that 
was granted to another less qualified employee who participated in such a relationship.  Id. 
at 1274.  The court found that this claim lacked evidentiary support.  Id. 
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the Broderick decision turned on the hostile environment theory, the 
EEOC’s Policy Guidance takes the position that the facts in Broderick 
could also support an implicit quid pro quo harassment claim “since the 
managers, by their conduct, communicated a message to all female 
employees in the office that job benefits would be awarded to those who 
participated in sexual conduct.”123   
The same year that Broderick was decided, the Third Circuit rejected 
a paramour claim brought by a plaintiff employed at a plant in Miller v. 
Aluminum Company of America.124  The court found that such claims 
“underestimate the essential element of disparate treatment based on 
gender.”125  The court adhered to the DeCintio holding, finding 
preferential treatment arising from a consensual relationship between a 
supervisor and employee does not qualify as gender-based 
discrimination.126 
                                                 
123 Policy Guidance, supra note 85 (citing Broderick, 685 F. Supp at 1278).  The EEOC 
guidelines further note that there were instances of unwanted sexual advances directed at 
the plaintiff by her supervisor, which supported a quid pro quo claim more than a hostile 
environment claim.  Id.  See also Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Va. 1988).  
Although Spencer did not involve sexual favoritism, it is an early example of a case that 
supports the proposition that pervasive sexual conduct can create a hostile work 
environment for those who find it offensive, even if the targets of the conduct welcome it 
and even if no sexual conduct is directed at the persons bringing the claim.  Policy 
Guidance, supra note 85, at n.14.  In Spencer, the supervisor of an office engaged in daily 
horseplay of a sexual nature with female subordinates.  Spencer, 697 F. Supp. at 213.  This 
behavior included sitting on their laps, touching them in an intimate manner, and making 
lewd comments.  Id.  The subordinates joined in and generally found the horseplay funny 
and not offensive.  Id. at 214.  With the exception of one incident, none of the horseplay was 
directed at the plaintiff.  Id.  The supervisor was also engaged in consensual relations with 
at least two of his subordinates.  Id.  The court found that the supervisor’s conduct would 
have interfered with the work performance and would have seriously affected the 
psychological well-being of a reasonable employee, and on that basis it found a violation of 
Title VII.  Id. at 218. 
124 Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 501 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  The Aluminum court also examined and ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s other 
claims alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and that her 
termination resulted from preferential treatment of males in her workplace.  Id. at 501-04.  
The plaintiff then abandoned her original claim that she was discharged because of 
preferential treatment of males, and based her new discharge claim solely on the favoritism 
shown to her manager’s lover.  Id. at 502.  The court found that the defendant had brought 
forth “ample” evidence of legitimate reasons for the plaintiff’s discharge and that the 
plaintiff was discharged because the other woman was more experienced in the position 
and had received higher performance ratings.  Id. at 503.  As for the plaintiff’s “paramour” 
and hostile environment claims, summary judgment was granted to the defendant.  Id. at 
508. 
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In examining DeCintio and Broderick, there appear to be two different 
scenarios in which a hostile work environment claim may arise when an 
employer promotes or hires the person with whom he or she is engaged 
in a consensual sexual relationship.127  One scenario centers upon a 
consensual relationship, which is kept separate from the workplace, until 
the paramour is hired or promoted, as was the case in DeCintio and 
King.128  The other scenario occurs when an employer or supervisor hires 
or promotes an employee with whom he or she has an already 
established consensual sexual relationship that is prevalent to those in 
the workplace, such as the situation in Broderick.129  When DeCintio and 
Broderick were decided, the EEOC guidelines had established that if a 
better qualified employee was denied job benefits in favor of a 
paramour, that situation might be enough to support a cause of action 
for sex discrimination under a hostile work environment theory, even if 
the discrimination was not so pervasive as to qualify as a hostile 
environment under the Meritor guidelines.130  This is precisely the 
scenario that the California Supreme Court was recently confronted with 
in Miller v. Department of Corrections.131 
F. The Decision in Miller v. Department of Corrections 
In a groundbreaking development, the California Supreme Court 
issued a unanimous decision in Miller v. Department of Corrections 
holding that employees may sue their employers for sexual harassment 
if a sexual affair between a supervisor and subordinate results in 
                                                 
127 Mary C. Manemann, The Meaning of “Sex” in Title VII: Is Favoring an Employee Lover a 
Violation of the Act?, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 612, 654, 656-57 (1989). 
128 Id.  Despite the circumstances, these cases created the possibility of Title VII violations.  
Id.  See also Kersul v. Skulls Angels, Inc., 495 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).  In Kersul the 
plaintiff alleged that a “close personal relationship” between her employer and another 
female employee resulted in promotions and benefits for the other employee, despite her 
substandard performance.  Id. at 887.  Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that she was 
terminated from her position because she criticized the promoted employee.  Id.  The court 
in Kersul refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim of sex discrimination based on a law with 
language nearly identical to that of Title VII, and directed her to amend her pleadings to 
specifically state that the employer and the promoted employee were having a sexual 
relationship.  Id. at 888-89. 
129 Id.  Thus under this scenario, courts have indicated that employees need not be 
specifically targeted themselves in order to have a hostile environment sexual harassment 
claim, if the harassment is sufficiently pervasive.  See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1277 (citing 
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
130 Id. 
131 Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss1/5
2006] Paramour No More 329 
widespread sexual favoritism, creating a hostile work environment for 
other employees not involved in the affair.132 
In Miller, Edna Miller and Frances Mackey, both employees at the 
Valley State Prison for Women, sued the Department of Corrections, 
alleging that they were subjected to sexual discrimination and 
harassment.133  Edna Miller began working for the Department in 1983.134  
In 1994, while she was employed at the Central California Women’s 
Facility, she heard rumors through other employees at the Department 
that the chief deputy warden was engaged in sexual affairs with his 
secretary and with another subordinate, an associate warden.135  Another 
department employee admitted to Miller that she was also engaged in a 
sexual affair with the warden.136  These affairs were not hidden from the 
rest of the department; rather, there were occasions when the three 
women would publicly argue over the warden while they were in the 
workplace.137   
In 1995, Miller competed for a promotion for facility captain against 
one of the women with whom the warden was sexually involved.138  The 
warden served on the interview panel and despite Miller’s “higher rank, 
superior education, and greater experience,” the promotion went to the 
warden’s paramour.139  At trial, Miller set forth evidence showing a 
                                                 
132 Stephen C. Tedesco & Jamie M. Harding, Employers Face Greater Risk from Workplace 
Romance: California Supreme Court Rules that Office Affair May Give Rise to Sexual Favoritism 
Claim, http://www.littler.com/presspublications/index.cfm?event=pubItem&pubItemID= 
12824&childViewID=250 (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). 
133 Miller, 115 P.3d at 80.  The plaintiffs also alleged that they were retaliated against for 
complaining about the discrimination and harassment.  Id.  The other causes of action 
brought by the plaintiffs were for sexual discrimination in violation of public policy, 
disability discrimination in violation of FEHA, negligent retention and promotion, invasion 
of privacy, assault and battery, false imprisonment, defamation, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  Id. at 80 n.2.  Frances Mackey passed away in 2003 and Edna Miller 
was designated as the lead plaintiff in this case.  Id. at 80 n.1. 
134 Id. at 80. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 83. 
138 Id. at 82. 
139 Id. Within a year and a half, the warden’s lover was moved up at an “unusually 
rapid” pace to the position of associate warden.  Id.  Because Miller was not previously 
promoted to facility captain, she was ineligible to compete for any higher-ranking 
positions, and the warden’s lover became her direct supervisor.  Id.  The plaintiffs 
expressed concerns about the warden’s behavior and as a result of the complaints, one of 
the plaintiff’s supervisors, who was also one of the warden’s friends, became abusive 
towards the plaintiffs.  Id. at 83.  Miller eventually resigned when her complaints failed to 
materialize into better working conditions, and Mackey also resigned after being 
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pattern wherein co-workers having sexual relationships with the warden 
received favorable treatment.140  She claimed that there was a message 
being sent to other employees, including herself, that the only way to 
move up in the workplace was to have sex with the warden, and that 
such conduct constituted sexual harassment in violation of California’s 
Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”),141 which is closely based 
upon Title VII of the federal law.142 
                                                                                                             
repeatedly questioned by her supervisor regarding her participation in a Department 
internal investigation into the warden’s behavior.  Id. at 84-85. 
140 Id. at 80. 
141 Id.  The FEHA defines “harassment because of sex as including sexual harassment, 
gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions.”  Department of Fair Employment and Housing, Definition of Sexual 
Harassment, http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/statutes/sexualhar.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).  
The FEHA regulations define “sexual harassment” as “unwanted sexual advances, or 
visual, verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”  Id.  This definition includes many 
types of offensive behavior, including gender-based same sex harassment. 
The following is a partial list of violations: Unwanted sexual advances; 
Offering employment benefits in exchange for sexual favors; Making 
or threatening reprisals after a negative response to sexual advances; 
Visual conduct: leering, making sexual gestures, displaying of 
suggestive objects or pictures, cartoon or posters; Verbal conduct: 
making or using derogatory comments, epithets, slurs, and jokes; 
Verbal sexual advances or propositions; Verbal abuse of a sexual 
nature, graphic verbal commentaries about an individual’s body, 
sexually degrading words used to describe an individual, suggestive 
or obscene letters, notes or invitations; Physical conduct: touching, 
assault, impeding or blocking movements. 
Id. 
Under FEHA, “[a]ll employers are prohibited from harassing employees in the workplace.” 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, Employer Liability, http://www.dfeh.ca. 
gov/statutes/employerliability.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). 
If harassment occurs, an employer may be liable even if management 
was not aware of the harassment. An employer might avoid liability if 
the harasser is a non-management employee, the employer had no 
knowledge of the harassment, and there was a program to prevent 
harassment. If the harasser is a non-management employee, the 
employer may avoid liability if the employer takes immediate and 
appropriate corrective action to stop the harassment once the employer 
learns about it. Employers are strictly liable for harassment by their 
supervisors or agents. The harasser can be held personally liable for 
damages. Additionally, Government Code section 12940, subdivision 
(k), requires an entity to take “all reasonable steps to prevent 
harassment from occurring.” If an employer has failed to take such 
preventative measures, that employer can be held liable for the 
harassment. A victim may be entitled to monetary damages even 
though no employment opportunity has been denied and there is no 
actual loss of pay or benefits. 
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The trial court dismissed the case, finding that the warden’s sexual 
favoritism did not constitute harassment or discrimination under 
FEHA.143  The California Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that 
non-favored employees are not victims of sexual harassment or 
discrimination just because a supervisor grants favorable employment 
opportunities to the person with whom the supervisor is having a sexual 
affair.144  The court found that the female employees who were passed 
over for promotions were in the same situation as male employees who 
were passed over for the same employment benefits, thus concluding 
that the case was not founded on sex based discrimination.145  
                                                                                                             
Id.  Under FEHA, all employers have a legal obligation to prevent sexual harassment.  
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, Employer Obligations, http://www.dfeh. 
ca.gov/statutes/employerobligations.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). 
Employers must take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination 
and harassment from occurring.  Employers must help ensure a 
workplace free from sexual harassment by posting in the workplace a 
poster made available by the Department of Fair Employment and 
Housing.  Employers must help ensure a workplace free from sexual 
harassment by distributing to employees information on sexual 
harassment. An employer may either distribute a brochure that may be 
obtained from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing or 
develop an equivalent document, which must meet the following 
requirements: The illegality of sexual harassment; The definition of 
sexual harassment under state and federal laws; A description of 
sexual harassment, utilizing examples; The internal complaint process 
of the employer available to the employee; The legal remedies and 
complaint process available through the Department and the Fair 
Employment and Housing Commission; Directions on how to contact 
the Department and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission; 
[and] The protection against retaliation for opposing the practices 
prohibited by law or for filing a complaint with, or otherwise 
participating in investigative activities conducted by, the Department 
or the Commission. 
Id. 
142 Thomas G. Servodidio, Recent California Employment Cases: Instructive for Employers in 
All States, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Sept. 7, 2005 (also available on Westlaw at 2005 WLNR 
14088574).  The court noted that in interpreting California’s FEHA, it would look to federal 
authorities interpreting Title VII.  Miller, 115 P.3d at 88. 
143 Miller, 115 P.3d at 85-86.  The trial court determined that the evidence of the warden’s 
sexual favoritism did not constitute discrimination or harassment under the FEHA, thus 
summary judgment was granted to the defendant on that claim.  Id. at 85. 
144 Id. 
145 Id.  In regards to the plaintiff’s claim that the warden’s behavior created an actionable 
hostile work environment claim, the Court of Appeals determined that: 
Ignoring for the moment evidence of retaliation for threatened, or 
actual, reporting of the relationships, plaintiffs have demonstrated 
unfair conduct in the workplace by virtue of [the warden’s] 
preferential treatment of his various sexual partners.  However, 
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The California Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily on the 1990 
EEOC guidelines addressing employer liability under Title VII for sexual 
favoritism, finding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of 
sexual harassment.146  The EEOC policy statement explains that while an 
isolated incident of favoritism toward a paramour will not support a 
sexual harassment claim, a “widespread sexual favoritism” involving 
consensual relations may support a claim for workplace harassment 
based on a hostile work environment for both male and female co-
workers.147  The court acknowledged that an isolated incident of 
favoritism towards an employee, with whom a supervisor is engaged in 
a consensual sexual affair, does not ordinarily constitute sexual 
harassment.148  The court concluded, however, that if the sexual 
favoritism in the workplace is “sufficiently widespread it may create an 
actionable hostile work environment in which the demeaning message is 
conveyed to female employees that they are viewed by management as 
‘sexual playthings’” or that the only way for a female employee to 
advance her career is to engage in sexual conduct with her supervisor.149  
                                                                                                             
beyond the fact of those relationships and the preferential treatment, 
plaintiffs have not shown a concerted pattern of harassment 
sufficiently pervasive to have altered the conditions of their 
employment on the basis of sex.  Plaintiffs were not themselves 
subjected to sexual advances, and were not treated any differently than 
male employees at [the prison].  Hence the trial court correctly 
concluded there is no evidentiary basis for plaintiffs’ various sex 
discrimination and harassment claims. 
Id. at 86. 
146 Id at 90.  The court found that “an employee may establish an actionable claim of 
sexual harassment . . . by demonstrating that widespread sexual favoritism was severe or 
pervasive enough to alter his or her working conditions and create a hostile work 
environment.”  Id. 
147 Id. at 88.  Accordingly, a hostile work environment claim can be found regardless of 
whether any objectionable conduct is directed at both male and female employees, and 
regardless of whether those who were actually granted some type of favorable treatment 
willingly engaged in the sexual favors or acts.  Id. at 816.  See also supra Part II.D. 
148 Miller, 115 P.3d at 80.  See also supra Part II.D. 
149 Miller, 115 P.3d at 80.  The Court found that this was much more than an isolated act 
of favoritism by the warden towards his paramours given that he had caused his 
paramours to be transferred to his new facility, had allowed the other supervisor to abuse 
those who complained about his sexual affairs, specifically the plaintiff, and had solidified 
his paramour’s job advancement based on sexual favors.  Id. at 90.  All of these factors led 
the Court to its decision that the message was implicitly conveyed that the management 
viewed women as “sexual playthings,” noting specifically that “it is clear under California 
law that a plaintiff may establish a hostile work environment without demonstrating the 
existence of coercive sexual conduct directed at the plaintiff or even conduct of a sexual 
nature.”  Id. at 92.  This decision allows lawsuits by any employee challenging the 
employment decisions by a supervisor who is confirmed to be engaged in, or is believed to 
be engaged in, an office relationship.  Greg Klawitter, Three California Supreme Court 
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The court found the conduct to be “severe or pervasive” enough to alter 
other employees’ working conditions and create a hostile work 
environment.150  Therefore, Miller is the first published decision finding a 
hostile work environment claim viable without evidence that any 
individual, be it a third party colleague or the plaintiff herself, was 
directly subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct.151 
Sexual harassment jurisprudence has expanded quite a bit since 
“ladies day in the house” when the word “sex” was added to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.152  Forty years hence, sexual harassment laws are still 
being interpreted and expanded in new ways.153  It may be difficult to 
predict the future of the law, but it is possible to prepare for new 
interpretations and to modify current practices in an effort to catch 
problems before they start, from an employer, employee, and judicial 
perspective.154  
III.  ANALYSIS 
In light of Miller, the guidelines of hostile work environment 
jurisprudence have been significantly expanded and the implications 
that could arise, especially in the form of employer liability, are worthy 
of exploration.155  Part III begins with the proposition that the current 
EEOC guidelines are insufficient to handle sexual favoritism claims 
                                                                                                             
Decisions: Not All Good News (Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.mofo.com/news/ 
updates/bulletins/bulletin02030.html#ThreeCalifornia.  Thus any employee who knows 
about an office romance and believes that he or she has been the victim of some type of 
adverse employment decision can potentially file a lawsuit against the employer.  Id.  See 
also Birschtein v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 4th 994, 1007 (1st Dist. 2001), 
reh’g denied, S102158, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 288 (Cal. Jan. 16, 2002) (finding that employers are 
liable for failing to remedy a hostile or offensive work environment of which supervisory 
or management-level employees knew or should have known of the harassment and 
holding that the employer may be held liable for a managerial failure to intervene to 
prevent or end sexual harassment in the workplace caused by a fellow employee).  The 
federal standard for supervisory acts is different in that it requires that the employer have 
knowledge or notice of the harassment.  See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 
F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989). 
150 Id. at 91 (quoting Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal. 1999))  
The Supreme Court stated that the FEHA clearly intrudes upon personal relationships, 
thus any type of office romance between a supervisor and subordinate is subject to not only 
scrutiny, but also potential liability.  Id. at 93. 
151 John H. Douglas, Consensual Office Affairs: On-the-Job Relationships Pose Risks if They 
Evidence Widespread Sexual Favoritism, NAT’L L.J.,  Oct. 31, 2005, at 9.  See also supra note 90 
(cases holding contrary to the Miller holding). 
152 See supra Part II.A. 
153 See supra Part II.F. 
154 See infra Part III. 
155 See supra Part II.F. 
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based on hostile work environment sexual harassment jurisprudence,156 
and continues with a discussion of the tremendous effects Miller’s legacy 
will have on employers, employees, and the workplace atmosphere.157  
Finally, Part III analyzes why courts like the California Supreme Court 
have gone too far in expanding hostile work environment sexual 
harassment jurisprudence, which may lead to devastating effects on 
employers nationwide.158  This Part will also detail what steps employers 
must take to protect themselves.159  
A. Insufficient EEOC Guidance 
Hostile work environment sexual harassment jurisprudence has 
branched off in a new direction, dramatically increasing the potential 
breadth of sexual harassment law from the previously settled legal 
framework.160  Traditionally, federal and state courts have followed the 
reasoning stated in Section A of the EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual 
Favoritism that “an isolated instance of favoritism toward a “paramour” 
(or a spouse or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate 
against women or men in violation of Title VII, since both are 
disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.”161  However, now a 
precedent has been set, resulting from an adherence to Section C of the 
EEOC guidance, whereby employees may sue their employers for sexual 
harassment if a sexual affair between a supervisor and a subordinate 
results in sexual favoritism, thus creating a hostile work environment for 
those employees not involved in the affair.162   
The Miller decision creates a cause of action for employees who may 
challenge any decision of a supervisor who is involved in, or allegedly 
involved in, an affair or workplace romance and will create new sexual 
harassment claims where none previously existed.163  This is significant 
                                                 
156 See infra Part III.A. 
157 See infra Part III.B. 
158 See infra Part III.C. 
159 See infra Part III.C. 
160 See supra note 90. 
161 Policy Guidance, supra note 85.  According to Scott Witlin, a shareholder in the Los 
Angeles office of Ogletree Deakins, “The Miller decision weakens somewhat the long line of 
cases which held that favoritism toward a paramour was not discrimination against 
others.”  Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Workplace Romance Presents 
Liability Risk for California Employers (Aug./Sept. 2005), available at http://www.ogletree 
deakins.com/uploads/publications/CA-Alert%20Aug-Sept%202005.pdf. 
162 See supra Part II.F. 
163 Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.  “The facts in the Miller case were a bit extreme, 
but it is likely to spawn numerous lawsuits based on less extreme facts.”  Ron Brand, 
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because now both men and women can be deemed injured by sexual 
favoritism.164  Given the long line of cases adhering to diametrically 
opposed legal standards than that which Miller created, employers faced 
with such claims will undoubtedly argue the merits of the former 
standard in hostile work environment sex discrimination cases to 
prevent the Miller rationale from prevailing.165    
The EEOC has not fully addressed the scope of this issue, and as 
demonstrated in California, fifty states may have fifty different 
approaches to widespread sexual favoritism claims with no consistency 
among them.166  Before Miller, courts relied on the standard set forth in 
Section A of the EEOC guidance which describes in vague terms the 
requirements for an isolated sexual favoritism claim.167  Although 
Section A has been the default guidance for many courts, it fails to 
clearly define and explain specific characteristics akin to isolated 
favoritism as opposed to widespread favoritism.168  The policy guidance 
is unclear as to why a party’s claim may fail on grounds of being isolated 
and how many incidents must occur for a claim to fit into the “isolated 
favoritism” category.169  Furthermore, the EEOC has failed to explain 
what players are involved in an isolated favoritism claim.170  This lack of 
clarification makes it difficult to differentiate between isolated and 
widespread favoritism and leaves employers, employees and the courts 
with very little guidance to follow.171   
The current EEOC guidance is also insufficient to adjudicate 
widespread sexual favoritism claims.172  Section C of the policy guidance 
provided by the EEOC has suggested for several years the theoretical 
possibility of a claim for sexual harassment based on sexual favoritism, 
but the Miller decision is the first to fully succumb to the EEOC’s 
guidance on widespread favoritism.173  Thus, despite the completely 
consensual nature of the affair or romance, any employee, male or 
female, who believes that a paramour received special treatment, may 
                                                                                                             
Favoring a Paramour May Be Sexual Harassment (Oct. 2005), available at http://laborlawyers. 
com/CM/Labor%20Letter/eLLoctoberr2005.pdf . 
164 Douglas, supra note 151. 
165 See supra note 90. 
166 See supra Part II.F. 
167 See supra note 90. 
168 See supra note 86 and infra Part IV. 
169 See supra note 86 and infra Part IV. 
170 See supra note 86 and infra Part IV. 
171 See supra note 86 and infra Part IV. 
172 See supra note 86 and infra Part IV. 
173 See supra Part II.F. 
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now sue, as long as the conduct was considered severe and pervasive.174  
However, Section C fails to clearly explain what constitutes this type of 
behavior, how frequently the alleged conduct must occur, who can be 
the perpetrator or victim in a widespread sexual favoritism claim, and 
what exactly widespread favoritism means.175   
Based upon the recent analysis of the EEOC guidance in Miller, the 
vagueness of the language used in Sections A and C may lead to broader 
interpretations of the law than the EEOC intended when the guidance 
was drafted.176  The implications derived from Miller will impact sexual 
harassment jurisprudence for years to come as employers and the courts 
battle over sexual favoritism and the fine line differentiating “isolated” 
and “widespread” sexual favoritism.177  Without clearer direction from 
the EEOC, there is no telling how far sexual favoritism claims may reach 
and how much sexual harassment jurisprudence will continue to 
expand.178   
B. Broadened Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence Affecting Employers 
A whole new class of sexual harassment cases has emerged, brought 
by a new class of plaintiffs, to recover under a theory that their 
workplace is permeated with widespread sexual favoritism as a result of 
consensual sexual relationships among colleagues.179  Miller drastically 
expands the scope of hostile workplace sexual harassment claims and 
opens employers to liability from which they previously were immune 
under existing sexual harassment jurisprudence.180  Thus, the broadened 
                                                 
174 Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.  See also supra Part II.F. 
175 See infra Part IV.  Additionally, the Court in Miller failed to clearly explain when a 
workplace “gets to the point where women are ‘sexual playthings.’”  Brand, supra note 163. 
176 Brand, supra note 163. 
177 Elizabeth M. Marsh, Sexual Favoritism: When an Office Romance Can Result in a Hostile 
Work Environment Claim (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.thompsoncoe.com/ 
default.aspx?tabid=116&ArticleID=229&ctl=AttPub&mid=791&From=Att&action=Edit. 
178 See infra Part IV.  “The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller means that employers now 
face greater risk from workplace romances, and the decision will impact sexual harassment 
litigation for years to come as both employers and the courts struggle with the definition of 
sexual favoritism and the difference between isolated and widespread sexual favoritism.”  
Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. 
179 See supra Part II.F. 
180 Michael J. Lotito, Workplace Romance May Create Hostile Work Environment for Other 
Employees (July 25, 2005), available at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article. 
cfm?aid=818.  See also supra note 90. 
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scope of hostile work environment sexual harassment claims may have a 
great effect on all aspects of the workplace.181   
Prior cases limited actionable sexual harassment claims to only those 
employees either directly involved in sexual liaisons at the workplace or 
recipients of unwanted sexual advances on the job.182  The Miller holding 
demonstrates the extent to which intra-office relationships can lead to 
litigation, and now, as a result of this holding, not necessarily just 
litigation brought by a scorned lover.183  The risk-management 
implications from an employer’s perspective are now far greater for any 
kind of interactions between supervisory and subordinate employees, be 
it simply flirtatious banter or a full blown consensual affair.184  This new 
standard practically guarantees that any action taken by a supervisor 
and his or her paramour in the workplace will be subject to heightened 
scrutiny because employers will now be forced to monitor their 
employees’ conduct and the relationships of their supervisors to ensure 
that paramour favoritism does not become a widespread problem within 
the workplace.185  Employers will have to take great care to investigate 
workplace rumors and carefully monitor and review any new hires or 
promotions in which a supervisor is involved in order to avoid hostile 
work environment claims from third party employees down the road.186   
By thoroughly investigating purportedly severe and pervasive 
discrimination claims brought by non-favored employees, employers 
will be left with little choice but to inquire into affairs that previously 
may have been considered private matters between mutually consenting 
adults.187  If the alleged hostile environment claim were to involve only 
one paramour, then even under the Miller standard, a claim of 
discrimination might not be actionable.188  However, if the claim involves 
more than one alleged paramour, the employer should consider whether 
                                                 
181 See supra Part II.F.  “Although this is a California decision, employment lawyers 
everywhere are sounding the alarm for employers who wish to avoid this type of claim.”  
Marsh, supra note 177. 
182 Lotito, supra note 180.  See also supra Part II.B. 
183 See supra Part II.F. 
184 See supra Part II.F. 
185 Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.  The California Supreme Court, in recognizing 
that its decision puts employers in the position of becoming involved in employees’ 
personal consensual relationships, noted that the consensual relationship alone is not the 
problem; rather, it is the effect of the relationship upon the workplace that creates potential 
liability.  Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 94 (Cal. 2005). 
186 See supra Part II.F. 
187 See supra Part II.F.  “Alliances, affairs and romances between employees are a fact of 
life.”  Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. 
188 See supra Part II.F. 
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the supervisor’s actions may be considered severe or pervasive and 
whether such conduct interferes with other employees’ working 
conditions or work performance, as was found to be the case in Miller.189  
Unfortunately, the Miller court failed to clearly establish when conduct 
within a workplace reaches the point where women are seen as “sexual 
playthings,” which still makes the severe and pervasive requirement 
inquiry unclear.190  Thus, there is very little guidance provided to 
employers which can be used as guidelines in looking for these warning 
signs in order to protect themselves.191   
C. Preventative Measures Must Be Taken by Employers 
The workplace is a major social center for men and women who 
share a common interest through their employment and who may spend 
eight to twelve hours a day working with and getting comfortable with 
other employees.192  Employees often meet their significant other in the 
workplace.193  In light of this expanded sexual harassment jurisprudence, 
employers face new risks and need to gain an understanding of how 
everyday operations may be impacted within the workplace.194  
Employers may not learn about a consensual relationship until it has 
already had an adverse effect on the workplace and once it is that late in 
the game, employers may face significant liability for sexual 
harassment.195   
The Miller court failed to lay out precise standards spelling out the 
differences between isolated and widespread sexual favoritism.196  Thus, 
there appears to be a very thin line separating the two, which guarantees 
that any action taken by a supervisor with regard to his or her paramour 
could leave the employer wide open to lawsuits filed by non-favored 
employees.197  Employers need to become aware that sufficiently severe 
or pervasive circumstances may provide the basis for a cause of action 
                                                 
189 See supra Part II.F. 
190 See supra Part II.F. 
191 See supra Part II.F. 
192 Dennis M. Powers, The Eight Managerial Office Romance Strategies, http://www.the 
vault.com/nr/newsmain.jsp?nr_page=3&ch_id=420&article_id=19042&cat_id=1441 (last 
visited June 30, 2006). 
193 Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.  See also supra Part I. 
194 See supra Part II.F. 
195 Jack Sholkoff, California Supreme Court Expands Definition of Sexual Harassment; Court 
Imposes New Duties on Employers To Monitor Effects of Consensual Relationships Between 
Employees (July 19, 2005), available at http://www.martindale.com/labor-employment-
law/article_Holland-Knight-LLP_173296.html. 
196 See supra Part II.F. 
197 See supra Part II.F. 
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for sex discrimination, despite the fact that the employer may have 
assumed that any decisions were based on personal preference rather 
than sex.198  A politically incorrect twist is that Miller may have the effect 
of “leveling the workplace playing field somewhat for the ‘attractively 
impaired’”199 as supervisors consciously or subconsciously monitor their 
own behavior for signs of favoritism based on lusty appetites or physical 
appearance.200   
Because it is not the affair or romance itself that is unlawful, but its 
possible impact on other employees that is the impetus for employer 
liability, all employers can do to protect themselves is to prevent the 
romantic relationship from affecting other employees in the 
workplace.201  First, employers need to treat claims of sexual favoritism 
as seriously as a quid pro quo claim for unwanted sexual advances and 
follow up on any claims with prompt and thorough investigations, just 
as they would do for any other sexual harassment claim.202   
Second, employers should take preventative measures including the 
implementation of “detailed, narrowly-tailored anti-harassment, non-
fraternization, and/or anti-nepotism policies”203 which discourage office 
                                                 
198 Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism, N.Y.L.J., 
Aug. 1, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.weil.com/wgm/pages/Controller.jsp?z=r&sz= 
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199 Douglas, supra note 151. 
200 Id. 
201 Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132.  A spokesman for the California Attorney 
General’s office called Miller a warning that “tells employers that having an antinepotism 
policy is not enough.”  Lotito, supra note 180. 
201 Lotito, supra note 180.  Employers “need to do more to make sure . . . [they] have a 
hostility-free work environment even when workers are having consensual sexual 
relationships.”  Id. 
202 See supra Part II.C. Employers that think they are safe under the protection of 
employment practices liability insurance must verify that their coverage extends to new 
causes of action such as job related favoritism leading to sexual harassment claims, or else 
seek out other measures to reduce the risks.  Lotito, supra note 180. 
203 Klawitter, supra note 149.  Employers need to hit home the message to their 
supervisors that the implications of Miller mean that an inter-office sexual relationship 
need not be coerced in order to result in potential employer liability.  Id.  See Powers, supra 
note 192. 
1. Adopt a Reasonable Office Romance Policy.  Most companies 
adopt a “benign neglect” policy towards office romances between 
coworkers, provided there are no legitimate complaints about 
performance or keeping the relationship discrete.  Many will adopt a 
more restrictive approach to boss/subordinate relationships, including 
the ability to transfer or remove the evaluative function of the 
subordinate to a third party.  It makes sense to adopt written 
reasonable policies, so employees understand the ground rules and 
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relationships, particularly between employees who are in a 
subordinate/supervisor work-relationship to the extent allowed by state 
privacy laws.204  Of course a fine line exists as to policies engaging in the 
latter arrangement where two people on equal footing engage in a 
                                                                                                             
feel comfortable in their workplace (see The Office Romance for the 
managerial details). 
2. Communicate this Policy. Clearly communicate your firm’s 
reasonable policies on office romance—including who to contact for 
confidential advice and what procedures to follow in a conflict-of-
interest or supervisorial situation. Be sure that every employee 
understands the corporate climate at your office. 
3. Mediate.  When a broken romance spills over into the workplace, 
restrain the urge to arbitrarily assign blame and transfer or fire the 
culprit under a one-size-fits-all sexual harassment policy. Instead, 
suggest mediation to help the couple work out their differences—and 
the conditions under which to continue working together.  A mediator 
can be a trained facilitator, the company appointed “ombudsman,” or 
even a coworker that both parties respect. 
4. Keep the channels of communication open.  Encourage 
employees to “speak their piece” openly and confidently, regardless of 
their complaint or concern.  A positive, supportive environment fosters 
not only the airing of problems, but also potential solutions—without 
an attorney getting into the fray. 
5. Follow basic concepts of fairness.  Fairness means employing a 
neutral and consistent investigation of complaints that treats each 
party with equal respect—regardless of gender or rank in the 
workforce.  Fairness does not mean addressing every employee’s 
complaint—only the reasonable and legitimate ones. 
6. Respond promptly and discreetly to problems.  Reassure 
employees that valid complaints will be taken seriously.  Make your 
response timely, confidential, and appropriate—whether it’s mediation 
or an investigation. Train your managers on how to properly manage 
workplace romances. 
7. Respect your employees’ privacy.  Adopt at least a neutral 
attitude toward employee dating and other off-the-job behavior, 
focusing instead on what workers do on company time in meeting 
corporate goals.  Unless you suspect illegal action, do not police your 
employees or intercept their confidential messages.  Don’t make 
employees into “love” police. 
8. Be “pro-interactive.”  Support concepts of gender equality, day 
care and elder care, family leave, and other corporate “pro-interactive” 
policies.  Support the inevitable relationships and marriages that will 
occur.  People who enjoy working together in an open, positive 
environment work better—and to the benefit of their supervisors and 
the company.  Pro-interactive companies just don’t have the same 
problems as others do.  Remember love does win out, despite 
restrictive policies—and the best employees do leave to work for more 
progressive organizations. 
Id. 
204 See Klein & Pappas, supra note 198.  The policies need to be drafted with care because 
they may create even more litigation.  Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. 
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relationship and one of the parties is promoted to a position of direct 
power or control over the other party in the consensual romantic 
relationship.205  Issues of that nature may encourage an all-or-nothing 
policy whereby no dating whatsoever is allowed between any employees 
in order to prevent case by case discrepancies.206  If employees are 
prohibited from dating, it is logical to infer that there should be no 
instances of sexual favoritism in the workplace.207  These are necessary 
measures to protect the employer and employee interests, even if such a 
policy is interpreted as interfering with personal and private 
relationships, which can in turn harm employee morale.208   
Third, employers may want to consider implementing consensual 
relationship agreements known as “love contracts.”209  Such agreements 
spell out the standards of behavior and professionalism required of the 
individuals that choose to enter into a romantic relationship and help 
protect employers from a sexual harassment suit if two employees are 
dating and the relationship ends badly.210  Furthermore, if the employees 
are in a supervisor-subordinate working relationship, it may be wise for 
both parties to agree that one will transfer to another area within the 
company or some other comparable provision.211  This type of protection 
may provide an alternative that appeases employers, while still allowing 
employees to maintain personal relationships without fear of reprisal.212 
Finally, employers may also want to consider adding another 
provision to the language of their sexual harassment policies that 
specifies that harassment can occur when supervisors favor subordinates 
or other colleagues due to consensual sexual involvement and include a 
discussion on the topic during anti-sexual harassment training.213  After 
                                                 
205 Lotito, supra note 180. 
206 Id. 
207 Klein & Pappas, supra note 198. 
208 Id.  A recent commentator on the Miller holding said that, “[T]he Court’s decision will 
likely have deleterious effects upon employee privacy and impose significant and what 
may seem as unfair burdens upon employers to monitor employee personal relationships 
in an effort to avoid sexual harassment—as defined by the Court in Miller—from 
developing in the workplace.”  Sholkoff, supra note 195. 
209 Tedesco & Harding, supra note 132. 
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Against Sexual Harassment Claims, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2005, at 24.  “The use of love contracts 
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Bass: Dangerous Liaisons:  Paramour No More
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
342 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
the Miller decision, a failure to implement these steps may send the 
message to other employees that engaging in an affair with a supervisor, 
although consensual, is the way to get ahead.214   
The Miller decision has created the need for the EEOC to clarify its 
Policy Guidance on Sexual Favoritism in the isolated and widespread 
contexts so that employers, employees, and the courts have a better set of 
guidelines to follow as sexual harassment jurisprudence grows and 
changes.215  Additionally, as the law changes, employers will be faced 
with many new challenges in the hostile work environment arena; 
therefore, employers must take proactive measures to prevent a 
widespread problem of sexual favoritism in the workplace.216  Employers 
will have to, at a minimum, discourage workplace affairs, and possibly 
prohibit them altogether, and then thoroughly investigate any claims 
that may arise.217   
IV.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE 
ON SEXUAL FAVORITISM 
One cannot fit a square peg into a round hole, but that is exactly 
what the California Supreme Court attempted to do in Miller.  The 
square peg of sexual favoritism, based on the EEOC Policy Guidance 
supporting the widespread favoritism theory, was forced into the round 
hole known as hostile work environment sexual harassment 
jurisprudence.  The broadened sexual harassment jurisprudence appears 
to raise as many questions as it answers.  Under this new standard, 
liability for all office romances turns on the fine line distinction between 
isolated sexual favoritism, which is currently not actionable, and 
widespread sexual favoritism, that now can be construed as creating a 
hostile work environment.218  New widespread favoritism cases will be 
coming to the forefront as a result of Miller, and perhaps an even greater 
expansion of the current sex discrimination laws will be the goal of the 
next case to come along.  Courts need a concise framework to control 
such claims.  In an effort to curb frivolous claims based on sexual 
favoritism, and to protect employers from undue liability, the guidance 
provided by the EEOC must be amended to provide a concise formula 
for the courts to follow when confronted with claims in the newly 
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recognized area of widespread sexual favoritism, in order to 
accommodate the proverbial square peg. 
Immediate action must be taken so that employers are not 
wrongfully subjected to liability for claims that do not fit within the 
ambiguous widespread sexual favoritism framework that currently 
exists under Section C of the EEOC Policy Guidance.219  Sex 
discrimination laws were not created to include unfairness claims, or 
claims based on a person’s preference for a paramour over other 
employees; rather they are in place to protect people from discrimination 
based on sex.220  The California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
law is overbroad; thus the way to control claims based on sexual 
favoritism is to clarify and define what types of conduct qualify as 
widespread, severe, or pervasive enough to be actionable under hostile 
work environment sexual harassment jurisprudence.  The EEOC Policy 
Guidance has been influential in helping courts analyze sexual 
harassment claims, however, no cognizable bright line standard exists 
which easily discerns the differences between isolated and widespread 
favoritism based on the current standards set out by the EEOC.  Updated 
standards need to be formulated to create a sexual favoritism framework 
that does not allow for gross misinterpretations of the law. 
Relevant circumstances within a hostile work environment may 
include the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s 
work performance.221  However, the severe and pervasive elements in 
hostile work environment cases are difficult to assess because courts 
have been inconsistent in defining the conditions needed to qualify as 
sufficiently severe or sufficiently pervasive.222 An additional 
inconsistency that must be addressed is the frequency with which the 
conduct must occur before a cause of action can be found under 
widespread favoritism.  There is also no clear standard in place for 
employer liability where supervisors are involved in the favoritism 
context.  Thus, based on the Miller holding, it is unclear what amounts to 
severe and pervasive, or even the exact definitions of isolated and 
widespread favoritism.  A single supervisor could have more than one 
paramour, or multiple supervisors could each have their own paramour.  
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Without exacting guidelines, it is impossible for employers to know 
what conduct qualifies as severe or pervasive within their workplace, if 
it is widespread or isolated, and how to prevent such acts in an effort to 
protect themselves from litigation. 
Section A of the EEOC guidance currently states:  
[A]n isolated instance of favoritism toward a 
“paramour” (or a spouse or a friend) may be unfair, but 
it does not discriminate against women or men in 
violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for 
reasons other than their genders.  A female charging 
party who is denied an employment benefit because of 
such sexual favoritism would not have been treated 
more favorably had she been a man, nor, conversely, 
was she treated less favorably because she was a 
woman. 223 
An amended version of Section A of the EEOC guidance may state:  
Isolated favoritism is favoritism toward a paramour that 
occurs on no more than three occasions and is not severe and 
pervasive within the workplace.  Conduct is found to be severe 
and pervasive when both men and women who find this 
offensive can establish that the conduct was so uncomfortable 
that that the conditions of [their] employment are altered, 
creating an abusive working environment that a reasonable 
person would find intolerable.  An isolated instance of 
favoritism toward a “paramour” (or a spouse or a 
friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate 
against women or men in violation of Title VII, since 
both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their 
genders.  A female charging party who is denied an 
employment benefit because of such sexual favoritism 
would not have been treated more favorably had she 
been a man, nor, conversely, was she treated less 
favorably because she was a woman. A claim alleging 
sexual favoritism will be considered isolated if the supervisor 
or authority figure was engaging in acts with a single 
paramour on three occasions or less, provided that the general 
workplace atmosphere was not impacted by such behavior.  If 
the supervisor or authority figure was involved with either 
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more than one paramour, or, acted on more than three 
occasions with either a single or multiple paramours, the 
behavior will not be considered isolated.  However, even if the 
behavior is not isolated, that does not mean that it fits within 
the definition of widespread favoritism, unless the behavior is 
also severe and pervasive, according to the guidelines specified 
in Section C. 
Although there have been consistent holdings rejecting isolated 
favoritism claims, for purposes of clearly differentiating isolated 
favoritism factors from widespread favoritism factors, it would be 
beneficial for the EEOC to alleviate any confusion by providing exact 
factors that spell out isolated favoritism characteristics under Section A 
of the policy guidance.  The amended version of Section A first includes 
a definition of “isolated.”  Isolated is defined in the dictionary as 
“occurring alone or once; sporadic.”224  However, the EEOC may refine 
the definition of isolated so that it is even more tailored to sexual 
harassment claims in the favoritism context.  
Second, the EEOC should include the exact number of incidents 
necessary to qualify as isolated favoritism.  For example, as shown in the 
amended version of Section A, an isolated instance of favoritism may 
mean that the alleged conduct occurred no more than three times.  The 
number of instances could be higher or lower depending on the EEOC’s 
adopted definition of isolated, assuming that the EEOC would not follow 
a strict dictionary definition.  Although three is an arbitrary number, the 
number of instances necessary to qualify as isolated should not be so 
limited that a claim could be made based on just a single incident.  If 
only one occurrence of favoritism was necessary to form a valid cause of 
action, then anyone could complain at any time about anything they 
perceive to be even remotely offensive.  If that were the case, then all 
incidents of favoritism would have to, by default, fit into the widespread 
favoritism category and there would be no way to differentiate between 
isolated and widespread claims.  Additionally, the amended version of 
Section A specifies that an isolated instance of favoritism is not severe or 
pervasive and provides guidelines as to when conduct qualifies as severe 
or pervasive.  
Third, the EEOC needs to identify the parties in an isolated 
favoritism claim.  Right now it is unclear whether an isolated claim 
involves just one supervisor and just one paramour, or if multiple 
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supervisors could each have their own paramours.  There are obvious 
ambiguities within this area that the EEOC should address by providing 
examples of who fits within the isolated framework.  The proposed 
amended version of Section A specifies that a supervisor or authority 
figure who has engaged in acts with a single paramour on three 
occasions or less, provided that the general workplace atmosphere was 
not impacted by such behavior, will be considered isolated.  
Furthermore, to elaborate on the differences between isolated and 
widespread favoritism claims, the proposed amended Section A also 
provides that a claim will not be considered isolated if a supervisor or 
authority figure was involved with either more than one paramour, or, 
acted on more than three occasions with either a single or multiple 
paramours. 
By creating its own definition of isolated sexual favoritism, spelling 
out the exact number of instances necessary to qualify as isolated 
favoritism, and clearly identifying the players, frivolous claims alleging 
sexual favoritism can be identified early and eliminated before they 
affect employers, other employees and the workplace morale. 
The same principles apply to Section C of the current EEOC 
guidance which currently provides: 
If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is 
widespread in a workplace, both male and female 
colleagues who do not welcome this conduct can 
establish a hostile work environment in violation of Title 
VII regardless of whether any objectionable conduct is 
directed at them and regardless of whether those who 
were granted favorable treatment willingly bestowed 
the sexual favors.  In these circumstances, a message is 
implicitly conveyed that the managers view women as 
“sexual playthings,” thereby creating an atmosphere 
that is demeaning to women.  Both men and women 
who find this offensive can establish a violation if the 
conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the 
conditions of [their] employment and create an abusive 
working environment.225   
An amended version of Section C may state:  
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If favoritism based upon a granting of sexual favors 
consensual romantic or sexual relationship is widespread in 
a workplace, both male and female colleagues who do 
not welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work 
environment in violation of Title VII, regardless of 
whether any objectionable conduct is directed at them 
and regardless of whether those who were granted 
favorable treatment willingly bestowed the sexual 
favors.  In these circumstances, if a message is implicitly 
conveyed in a severe or pervasive manner that the 
managers view women or men as “sexual playthings,” 
thereby creating an atmosphere that is demeaning to all 
women or men within the workplace.  The sexual favoritism 
is widespread if the relationship is conducted publicly within 
the workplace and is known or should be known by the 
employer, and where the favoritism was displayed in a severe 
and pervasive manner, occurring on at least four or more 
occasions.  The conduct may not be mere office gossip.  
Conduct is severe and pervasive when both men and 
women who find this offensive can establish that the 
conduct was so uncomfortable that the conditions of 
[their] employment are altered, creating an abusive working 
environment that a reasonable person would find intolerable.  
A claim alleging sexual favoritism will be considered 
widespread if the supervisor or authority figure was engaging 
in acts with a single paramour on three or more occasions and 
the general workplace atmosphere was permeated by such 
severe and pervasive behavior.  If the supervisor or authority 
figure was involved with more than one paramour, or, acted 
on more than three occasions with either a single or multiple 
paramours, the behavior will be considered widespread if the 
general workplace atmosphere was permeated by such severe 
and pervasive behavior.   
The requirements to bring a successful hostile work environment 
claim are stringent; therefore Section C of the EEOC guidance should 
ensure that the requirements for bringing a claim under the widespread 
favoritism theory are just as strict.226  As shown in the amended version 
of Section C, the EEOC should replace the words “granting of sexual 
favors” with “consensual romantic or sexual relationship.”  This change 
is necessary because the current wording creates the inference that the 
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relationship is based purely on sex or may even be a quid pro quo 
relationship.  As the amended Section C shows, it should be emphasized 
that the relationship in question was entered into by both parties on a 
consensual basis.  
Second, the line in the current EEOC guidance pertaining to claims 
brought by third parties who are not the targets of objectionable conduct 
should be eliminated.  This sentence causes problems because it allows 
anyone to bring a claim, even those not directly targeted by objectionable 
conduct.  Parties bringing claims under the widespread sexual favoritism 
framework should only be allowed to do so when the conduct is directed 
at them, or adversely affects all men and women in the workplace.  This 
clarification will help eliminate frivolous claims.  Furthermore, it is 
contradictory to say that a message is being conveyed that women are 
seen as “sexual playthings” when the women involved in the 
relationship willingly and consensually bestow sexual favors.  Section C 
does not currently take into consideration that a female supervisor could 
become involved with a male employee, even though the possibility 
exists that men could be consensually bestowing sexual favors and could 
thus be perceived by others in the workplace as “sexual playthings.”  
The proposed amended version of Section C eliminates this problem by 
acknowledging that men could also be viewed as “sexual playthings.”  
To that end, when the message is found to be demeaning to all women or 
men within the workplace, a claim will hold greater weight than if only 
one completely unrelated third party lodges a complaint because the 
possibility of the problem being widespread is considerably greater. 
Third, because this area of sexual harassment law is still rather 
unexplored, the EEOC must provide an exact definition of widespread 
favoritism.  The dictionary definition of widespread is “widely diffused 
or prevalent; widely extended or spread out.”227  Since widespread is a 
rather broad concept, the EEOC will have to first adopt a more specific 
definition that caters to the favoritism context.  For example, as shown in 
the proposed amended version, the EEOC must redefine widespread 
sexual favoritism.  The amended definition is better than the EEOC’s 
current explanation of widespread favoritism because it explains that an 
employer should know, or should have known of the conduct and when 
the conduct is considered to be common knowledge within the 
workplace, and how many incidents must occur to qualify as 
widespread.  Whatever definition the EEOC adopts needs to be clearly 
differentiated from its adopted definition of isolated favoritism. 
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Fourth, severe and pervasive elements are among the most 
important factors pertaining to a hostile work environment claim, yet 
there are no precise guidelines defining these elements for employers 
and courts to follow.228  There must be greater emphasis on the exact 
factors necessary to equate severe or pervasive behavior.  The dictionary 
definition of severe is “inflicting physical discomfort or hardship; 
inflicting pain or distress.”229  The dictionary definition of pervade, 
which is the root of pervasive, is “to become defused throughout every 
part.”230  A better explanation of severe or pervasive in the widespread 
favoritism context, as shown in the amended version of Sections A and 
C, would read,  
Conduct is severe or pervasive when both men and women 
who find this offensive can establish that the conduct has 
altered the conditions of [their] employment, creating an 
abusive working environment that a reasonable person would 
find intolerable.231   
The EEOC could also impose a mandatory sliding scale approach to 
be used when analyzing elements that could be perceived as severe or 
pervasive.232  This approach allows a greater degree of pervasiveness to 
make up for a lesser degree of severity and vice versa.233  These 
definitions and distinctions between severe and pervasive conduct are 
extremely important because they are the basis of hostile environment 
claims and yet there are currently no standard definitions for courts to 
follow when evaluating such claims. 
Fifth, greater emphasis needs to be placed on how the employee 
complaining about the harassment was actually affected by the alleged 
acts.  Since hostile work environment claims can currently be alleged by 
third parties who were not directly subjected to unwelcome sexual 
conduct, the degree of conduct that can be perceived as disparate is far 
broader.  The EEOC must address how vast the degrees of separation 
between the supervisor, paramour, and third party can be before the 
person is too far removed to make a claim.  For example, the EEOC could 
require that the person making the claim must share the same supervisor 
as the paramour, or that the paramour must have a comparable job 
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position as the complainant.  This type of guidance will ensure that 
claims made by far removed parties will not fit within the proscribed 
framework set out by the EEOC.  Furthermore, this type of guidance can 
be incorporated into company anti-dating policies to help employers and 
employees understand what types of conduct will cause trouble and 
who is in a position to make a claim should inappropriate conduct occur. 
Sixth, it is imperative that a minimum number of sexual favoritism 
instances must have occurred to fit within the widespread category.  This 
number must be considerably broader than the number of claims falling 
within the isolated favoritism category.  Although the four instance 
minimum mentioned in the above amended version of Section C is 
arbitrary, it shows that the conduct occurred frequently enough to be a 
legitimate problem that fits within the widespread sexual favoritism 
framework, as long as the conduct was also severe or pervasive under 
the amended EEOC guidance. 
Finally, the EEOC must also address the parties involved in a 
widespread sexual favoritism claim.  In Miller, the supervisor was 
romantically involved with three different women.234  The EEOC should 
specify that for a claim to fall within the widespread category, a 
supervisor must either engage in a certain specified number of instances 
of favoritism with only one paramour, or, the supervisor must engage in 
a certain number of separate acts with a minimum number of 
paramours.  As demonstrated in the amended version of Section C, this 
type of guidance will further the goal of drawing a brighter line between 
isolated and widespread sexual favoritism claims.   
Although sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims are very 
fact specific, the EEOC must provide greater guidance in this area.  The 
key is that employers and courts cannot be expected to delve into a new 
area of sexual harassment jurisprudence without having stricter 
guidelines to follow.  Although the above suggestions are strictly 
hypothetical, the principle ideas behind the amendments to the 
guidelines are applicable. By adding more specific information to the 
current EEOC guidelines, employers, employees, and the courts will 
have better guidance in this area of law.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The law is not perfect, which is why it is always changing and 
evolving alongside our nation.  However, the California Supreme 
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Court’s decision in Miller v. Department of Corrections has taken hostile 
work environment sexual harassment claims to an unprecedented level 
and courts are quickly responding to the new trend.235  Employers 
throughout the United States will inevitably suffer dire consequences if 
they are held responsible for consensual relationships that are nearly 
impossible to restrict.236  Although workplace romances are typically 
discouraged, there will never be a completely fool-proof plan to 
eliminate romances in the workplace, be they secretive or completely 
open.237  Employers need to know that they may be liable even when no 
one in the workplace is being discriminated against on the basis of sex.238  
The immediate solution to this growing problem is to provide stricter 
guidelines for the courts to follow which clearly spell out the exact 
elements necessary for a claim to be brought under the widespread 
sexual favoritism framework.239  With stricter guidelines and a sliding 
scale to help weigh the most important factors, the possibility of keeping 
the number of successful widespread sexual favoritism claims to a 
minimum may be achieved.240 
At this time, it is difficult to ascertain whether courts will follow 
Miller’s precedent or if they will continue to apply precedents, such as 
DiCintio, that clearly preclude claims of sexual discrimination based on 
sexual favoritism.241  Either way, the foundation for a whole new class of 
sexual harassment claims has been laid and employers nationwide 
should pay close attention because the California judiciary often sets the 
stage for precedents that are later adopted by other states and 
jurisdictions.242  Every office has its secret romances, but now, as this 
judicial trend spreads across the nation, employers may be the ultimate 
loser in the tangled game of lust.243 
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